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ABSTRACT
In this Article, we argue that the U.S. Supreme Court should route most Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure issues through the notice-and-comment rulemaking process of the Civil 
Rules Advisory Committee instead of issuing judgments in adjudications, unless the 
Court can resolve the case solely through the deployment of traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation.  While we are not the first to express a preference for rulemaking on civil 
procedure issues, we advance the position in four significant ways.  First, we argue that 
the Supreme Court in the civil procedure arena is vested with powers analogous to most 
administrative agencies.  Second, building upon this insight, we present a justification 
for favoring rulemakings over adjudications by analogy to administrative law.  Third, 
we couple this preference for rulemaking over adjudication with three criteria detailing 
when this presumption should apply.  Namely, we conclude that civil procedure issues 
are better resolved by reference to the Advisory Committee if the issue (a) requires an 
interpretation of a rule that rests substantially upon legislative facts, (b) calls for the 
resolution of a Chevron step-two-like ambiguity, or (c) seeks a resolution that approximates 
a legislative rule.  Only when traditional tools of statutory interpretation—text, history, and 
purpose—will resolve a case should the Court retain its disposition in the adjudicatory 
form.  Fourth, we offer the mechanisms for pragmatically achieving this preference for 
rulemaking both under existing law as well as through a new “referencing” procedure, 
without unduly constraining the flexibility needed by lower courts to implement the civil 
rules effectively.  In so doing, we contend that expanding the Court’s use of rulemaking 
not only should result in better rules but should also bolster the democratic legitimacy of 
the Court’s civil-rules decisionmaking.
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INTRODUCTION 
Like administrative agencies, “[t]he Supreme Court is a regulator.”1  Nowhere 
is this more true than in the civil procedure context.  Like an administrative agency, 
the Court’s role in civil procedure is to set policy—not simply to resolve partic-
ular disputes.2  And just like most administrative agencies—or regulators if you 
will—the Court may set civil procedure policy through case-by-case adju-
dication, as it did in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly3 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal 4 when 
it reinterpreted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2),5 or by promulgating 
generally applicable rules through a notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure.  
As Justice Stevens wrote in his Twombly dissent: “I would not rewrite the Na-
tion’s civil procedure textbooks and call into doubt the pleading rules of most of 
its States without far more informed deliberation as to the costs of doing so.  
Congress has established a process—a rulemaking process—for revisions of that 
order.”6  Although the Court faces this same choice between proceeding by rulemak-
ing or adjudication every time it addresses a civil procedure issue—whether it is 
setting pleading standards, determining the advisability of sanctioning entire law 
firms for the misconduct of counsel,7 or refashioning the law of summary 
judgment8—it has yet to devise a coherent framework for making this decision.  
Drawing lessons from administrative law, we aim in this Article to resolve this 
question by proposing that the Court create a presumption in favor of rulemak-
ing over adjudication when deciding civil procedure issues. 
  
1. Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1984). 
2. See id. at 4–5 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court’s role is uniquely one of policy setting, not 
dispute resolution). 
3. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
4. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
5. See, e.g., Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1294–1313 (2010) 
(discussing the radical changes wrought by the Court’s new approach to pleading). 
6. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 43 
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (facing a similar problem regarding Rule 68’s effect upon the 
availability of attorney fees and concluding that because the rule’s effect upon the availability of 
attorney fees was at least ambiguous, “the Court should have stayed its hand” and allowed legislation 
or court rulemaking to amend Rule 68). 
7. See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120 (1989). 
8. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 
(1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp , 475 U.S. 574 (1986); see also Mark 
Moller, Procedure’s Ambiguity, 86 IND. L.J. 645 (2011) (drawing comparisons between Twombly 
and Iqbal and the summary judgment trilogy). 
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Administrative agencies regularly face the same adjudication-versus-
rulemaking decision confronted by the Court in the civil procedure context.9  
Since the New Deal, Congress has routinely delegated broad lawmaking authority 
to administrative agencies charged with implementing a range of federal programs, 
just as it has delegated procedural rulemaking authority to the Supreme Court.  
In the course of implementing their delegated statutory authority, administrative 
agencies are tasked with numerous policy choices.  For example, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) must decide whether to consider certain business practices 
“unfair or deceptive.”10  In making these determinations, the FTC, like most other 
administrative agencies, has the discretion to choose between case-by-case adjudi-
cations, which create precedent, or by notice-and-comment rulemakings.  Although 
statutes occasionally specify that an agency must use rulemaking or adjudication 
to make certain policy decisions, most statutes delegate authority to agencies 
both to promulgate orders and rules and to leave it up to the agency to decide 
whether to make policy pursuant to adjudication or rulemaking.  This decision 
is known in administrative law as an agency’s “choice of policymaking form.”11 
In SEC v. Chenery Corp.,12 the Supreme Court held that “the choice made 
between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that 
lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”13  Federal 
courts thus rarely second-guess an administrative agency’s decision regarding 
whether to use rulemaking or adjudication to make a particular policy decision.  
Given the ubiquity of these determinations, jurists and scholars have recognized 
that an agency’s choice of policymaking form is a momentous decision and have 
developed a rich body of knowledge as to which form is superior for addressing 
particular types of questions.14  
We believe administrative law has much to offer the Court when it is decid-
ing which policymaking form it should choose in making civil procedure deci-
sions.  We contend that because the Court, like an agency, may set procedural 
policy via either form, it is apt to analogize the Court to an administrative agency 
  
9. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1386–
1403 (2004) (reviewing the multitude of policymaking forms available to agencies and the 
consequences of these varying forms). 
10. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). 
11. Magill, supra note 9, at 1383–84. 
12. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947). 
13. Id. at 203. 
14. See infra Part II (discussing the consensus in administrative law on the superiority of rulemaking to 
adjudication for setting policy in most contexts). 
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in this area.15  Given this congruity, we argue that the Court should conform to 
the longstanding consensus in administrative law that policy changes ought to be 
the product of rulemaking rather than adjudication.  While many have similarly 
expressed a preference that significant procedural policy changes be made by way 
of rulemaking, not adjudication,16 to date, jurists and scholars have not offered a 
  
15. This analogy between the Court in the civil procedure context and administrative agencies is 
understudied.  Laurens Walker provides the most wide-ranging use of this analogy in his call for 
the Civil Rules Advisory Committee to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of newly proposed rules 
similar to that done by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  See Laurens Walker, A 
Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455 (1993) (arguing 
that the Rules Advisory Committee should be treated as a “true” administrative agency and thus be 
subject to an OMB-like review of all new rules akin to that mandated by Executive Order No. 12,291).  
Others have offered more glancing treatment of the analogy.  See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Procedural 
Rulemaking Under the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 131 
U. PA. L. REV. 283, 309 n.107 (1982) (noting that civil rulemaking is analogous to administrative 
law in their disregard for matters of broader jurisprudential coherence); Lauren K. Robel, Grass 
Roots Procedure: Local Advisory Groups and the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 
879, 880 (1993) (“[T]he 1988 amendments to the Rules Enabling Act, intended to open the 
process up, relied on a very weak administrative law model of notice and comment.”); infra notes 
86–90 & 352 (providing additional sources that briefly compare and contrast administrative 
rulemaking and court rulemaking).  Finally, several commentators have suggested that the Court’s 
use of the certiorari power across all issues is perhaps best viewed as administrative power, although 
they do not discuss civil procedure directly.  See infra note 20. 
16. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 883–85 (2010) [hereinafter: Bone, Plausibility Pleading 
Revisited] (concluding, in a brief discussion, that the issues reached in Twombly and Iqbal would 
be better resolved in a rulemaking); Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, 
Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 889 (1999) [hereinafter Bone, 
The Process of Making Process] (“[A] centralized, court-based, and committee-centered process is well 
suited for making general constitutive rules that define the basic framework of a civil procedure 
system and more detailed rules that control particularly costly forms of strategic behavior.”); Paul D. 
Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 282 (arguing 
that the technical nature of the promulgation of judicial rules cannot sustain interest through 
typical political channels and should be left to the formal advisory committee process); Kevin M. 
Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 
850 (2010); Matthew A. Josephson, Some Things Are Better Left Said: Pleading Practice After Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 42 GA. L. REV. 867, 872–81 (2008); A. Benjamin Spencer, 
Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 454 (2008) (arguing that Twombly-style changes 
should have been made by the Advisory Committee and briefly sketching the institutional 
advantages of the committee); The Supreme Court—Leading Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV. 185, 305, 
315 (2007); Nathan R. Sellers, Note, Defending the Formal Federal Civil Rulemaking Process: Why 
the Court Should Not Amend Procedural Rules Through Judicial Interpretation, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
327, 378–79 (2011) (asserting, with a shorter treatment that civil procedure policy is better made in 
the Rules Committee, after providing a detailed account of the Twombly and Iqbal decisions).  
Similarly, many have called for greater involvement by the political branches in rulemaking.  See, 
e.g., Martin H. Redish & Uma M. Amuluru, The Supreme Court, the Rules Enabling Act, and the 
Politicization of the Federal Rules: Constitutional and Statutory Implications, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1303 
(2006) (arguing that the separation of substance and procedure in the Rules Enabling Act requires 
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fully developed justification for this preference, presented a set of criteria for 
choosing between policymaking forms, nor outlined a mechanism for achieving 
this preference. 
Thus, in Part I, we further develop the understudied analogy between the 
legal authority of administrative agencies and the Court in the field of civil proce-
dure.  In so doing, we review the power of the Court, like an agency, to set policy 
through case-by-case adjudication and the Court’s agency-like rulemaking power 
to draft and revise the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  We also strengthen this 
analogy by expounding on the striking similarities between the evolution of 
rulemaking experienced by both the Court and agencies. 
In Part II, we consider the superiority of the rulemaking form for making 
policy decisions.  Here, we begin by noting that it is the nearly uncontested truth 
in administrative law circles that for setting policy, a well-functioning, notice-
and-comment rulemaking procedure has extensive institutional advantages over 
adjudication.  We proceed to review these many advantages of rulemaking over adju-
dication, noting that the singular exception relevant to court rulemaking lies with 
the resolution of questions of law pursuant to traditional tools of statutory inter-
pretation (i.e., text, history, and purpose).  As such, we argue for a presumption in 
favor of rulemaking over adjudication for all civil rules issues that do not rest upon 
a question of statutory interpretation. 
In Part III, we address the question of when our preference for rulemaking 
may be overcome.  Dipping again into lessons learned from administrative law, 
we offer three criteria as guides for determining when an issue is better suited for 
determination in a rulemaking, as opposed to an adjudicative, form.  Namely, we 
assert that the Court should route to a rulemaking form those cases presenting 
issues of legislative fact, as contrasted with adjudicative facts; questions akin to 
Chevron-step-two issues, as opposed to Chevron-step-one issues; and policy 
pronouncements similar to legislative rules, rather than interpretive rules. 
In Part IV, we articulate how our preference for rulemaking on civil rules 
issues should be implemented and respond to some potential objections to our 
position.  We begin by offering a mechanism for referring cases to the Civil Rules 
Advisory Committee under the current statutory regime.  Recognizing that the 
current rulemaking regime—like rulemaking by administrative agencies more 
  
that the political branches take part in the formation of rules that are, by nature, partly substantive).  
Of course, some prefer vigorous judicial interpretation over rulemaking.  See infra note 220 (citing 
scholars who advocate for a more liberal brand of interpretation in relation to the rules of procedure). 
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generally—faces potential problems of ossification,17 we also argue for statutory 
reforms that would render the referencing of questions to the Advisory Committee 
more workable.  We then respond to the contention that a scheme that routes cases 
away from adjudication could unduly constrain the equitable flexibility needed by 
lower federal courts to implement the civil rules effectively.  We end this section 
with a few comments regarding deliberative democracy and theories of political 
legitimacy, contending that our approach would be a legitimacy-enhancing one.  
While we recognize that notice-and-comment rulemaking is not a panacea, we 
conclude the Article with a call for greater use of the Court’s rulemaking authority 
in the field of civil procedure, excepting those cases amenable to resolution by tra-
ditional tools of statutory interpretation. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT AS AN AGENCY IN THE ADMINISTRATION 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Our primary claim in this Part is that the Supreme Court functions much 
like an administrative agency when it makes law in the field of civil procedure.  
We first review the Court’s role, like that played by agencies, as the adjudicator of 
Rules18 cases and its agency-like power to promulgate Rules.  We conclude this 
Part by arguing that the Court’s history as a rulemaker mimics closely that of agen-
cies more generally, which bolsters our agency-analogy thesis. 
A. The Court as Adjudicator of the Civil Rules 
We begin, then, with a brief review of the options the Court has when decid-
ing which policymaking form to use when resolving civil procedure issues—
namely, adjudication or rulemaking.  First, the Court can make policy decisions 
regarding the application of the Rules by adjudicating cases and controversies that 
implicate civil procedure and fall within its subject matter jurisdiction.  This is 
true because the Court’s decisions establish new precedent that is binding on the 
  
17. The “ossification” hypothesis in administrative law posits that informal rulemaking has become “so 
heavily laden with additional procedures, analytical requirements, and external review mechanisms 
that its superiority to case-by-case adjudication is not as apparent now as it was before [informal 
rulemaking] came into heavy use,” and that “agencies are beginning to seek out alternative, less parti-
cipatory regulatory vehicles to circumvent the increasingly stiff and formalized structures of the 
informal rulemaking process.”  Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking 
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1386 (1992). 
18. We use “Rules” as a shorthand for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The term “rule” may 
denote another regime. 
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lower federal courts when they interpret or apply the Rules.19  By enacting the 
Judges’ Bill of 1925, Congress provided the Court with almost complete dis-
cretionary authority over its adjudicatory docket, a characteristic shared by most 
agencies.20  As a result, the Court may, and often does, set civil procedure policy 
by way of issuing opinions as the result of adjudication. 
The Twombly and Iqbal cases illustrate the Court’s authority to exercise its 
adjudicatory power to set civil procedure policy—although one could just as easily 
point to the Court’s summary judgment, discovery, or sanctioning jurisprudence.  
After decades of upholding the “no set of facts” standard of Conley v. Gibson,21 
the Court changed course in Twombly, an antitrust class action suit against several 
telecommunications providers.22  The complaint asserted simply that the defen-
dants had colluded in violation of the antitrust laws, but it failed to provide any 
specific factual allegations of an unlawful agreement in support of that claim.23  
While the plaintiffs’ bare allegation would have survived a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge 
under the well-established Conley standard,24 the Twombly Court decided to chart 
a new course and overruled Conley.25  In lieu of the Conley standard, the Twombly 
Court required a reviewing court to disregard all recitals in a complaint that are 
mere legal conclusions and assess whether the well-pleaded factual allegations 
  
19. See Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial Decisionmaking, 76 
U. CHI. L. REV. 965, 976 (2009) (recognizing that “[a]s a functional matter, judicial opinions 
themselves have the force of law” because “[t]he reasons that a court gives for its decision—the broader 
principles under which the court situates the facts and outcome of the case—are controlling on 
future courts”). 
20. See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT’S ROLE: A 
THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS 12 (1986); Edward A. Hartnett, 
Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1643 (2000); Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, 160 
U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
21. 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (“[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless 
it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 
would entitle him to relief.”).  The Court had regularly upheld this standard for the fifty years 
between Conley and Twombly.  See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007); Swierkiewicz 
v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 507 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & 
Coordination Unit, 512 U.S. 163, 168 (1993); Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 
14, 150 n.3 (1984); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976); Beacon 
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506 (1959). 
22. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549–50 (2007). 
23. Id. at 565 n.10. 
24. Id. at 561. 
25. Id. at 563 (“But the passage so often quoted fails to mention this understanding on the part of the Court, 
and after puzzling the profession for 50 years, this famous observation has earned its retirement.”). 
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state a claim for relief that is “plausible.”26  In effect, the opinion crafted a new and 
more demanding test for assessing the sufficiency of complaints.  The Court expli-
citly predicated this more rigorous standard on its desire to avoid the high costs 
of discovery and related incentives to settle unmeritorious cases.27  Two years 
later, the Iqbal Court added two glosses on Twombly’s plausibility standard.  First, 
it held that the plausibility standard applies in all cases—not just those, such as 
antitrust cases, where discovery costs are expected to be high.28  Second, the Iqbal 
Court provided a more detailed presentation of the plausibility standard, holding 
that it is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 
judicial experience and common sense”29 with the goal of determining whether the 
complaint’s allegations create a “reasonable inference that the defendant is liable.”30 
Importantly for our discussion, commentators almost universally recognized 
Twombly and Iqbal as statements regarding the policy underlying pleading 
requirements in federal court31 and, by extension, state court32—not the legalistic 
interpretation of Rule 8.  Proponents of the opinions thus welcomed them, not 
because of their statutory parsing, but rather because they limited discovery costs.33  
  
26. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” (quoting Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 570)); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right 
to relief above the speculative level.”). 
27. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–59 (basing the holding, in part, on the notion that surviving a 12(b)(6) 
motion will lead to astronomical discovery costs for the defendants that, in turn, will have the in 
terrorem effect of inducing them to settle even when they have strong bases for a defense); Clermont 
& Yeazell, supra note 16, at 826–27 (reviewing Twombly). 
28. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953. 
29. Id. at 1950. 
30. Id. at 1949. 
31. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the same). 
32. Several state high courts have adopted Twombly and/or Iqbal as the proper interpretation of their 
respective jurisdiction’s version of Rule 8(a)(2).  See Mazza v. Housecraft LLC, 18 A.3d 786, 791 
(D.C.), vacated, 22 A.3d 820 (D.C. 2011); Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 888 N.E.2d 879, 890 
(Mass. 2008); Doe v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Neb, 788 N.W.2d 264, 278 (Neb. 2010); 
Sisney v. Best Inc., 754 N.W.2d 804, 808–09 (S.D. 2008).  Other state high courts have 
specifically rejected adoption of Twombly and Iqbal.  See Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 189 
P.3d 344, 345 (Ariz. 2008); McKinnon v. W. Sugar Co-Op Corp., 225 P.3d 1221, 1223 (Mont. 
2010); Colby v. Umbrella, Inc., 955 A.2d 1082, 1087 n.1 (Vt. 2008); McCurry v. Chevy Chase 
Bank, FSB, 233 P.3d 861, 863–64 (Wash. 2010); Roth v. DeFeliceCare, Inc., 700 S.E.2d 183, 189 
n.4 (W.Va. 2010); see also Charles H. Wesley Educ. Found., Inc. v. State Election Bd., 654 S.E.2d 
127, 132 (Ga. 2007) (citing both Conley and Twombly as good law in the same paragraph). 
33. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) 
Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J L. & POL’Y 61, 62 (2007) (contending that Twombly reached 
the right result but for the wrong reasons); Lynn C. Tyler, Recent Supreme Court Decision Heightens 
Pleading Standards, Holds Out Hope for Reducing Discovery Costs, 77 U.S.L.W. 2755 (2009); Mark 
Herrmann, James M. Beck & Stephen B. Burbank, Debate, Plausible Denial: Should Congress 
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Critics also tended to focus their discontent on the policy implications of Twombly 
and Iqbal.34  These critiques run the gamut: (1) the opinions wrongly apply the plau-
sibility rule to suits that are not likely to trigger expensive discovery;35 (2) the 
opinions inaptly solve a discovery-abuse problem (that may not have needed solv-
ing) with a pleading-law solution;36 (3) the opinions unfairly discriminate against 
claims in which plaintiffs must allege facts that are uniquely in defendants’ posses-
sion and, as such, are only available to plaintiffs via discovery (e.g., intentional 
employment discrimination claims);37 (4) the opinions are based upon faulty factual 
assumptions;38 and (5) the opinions unduly deny plaintiffs with limited resources 
their day in court.39  The empirical results of the impact of these cases, however, 
remain mixed.40 
  
Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141, 142–47 (2009), 
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/PlausibleDenial.pdf (Opening Statement of Herrmann 
and Beck) (arguing that Twombly and Iqbal were properly decided in an adjudication, are correct 
interpretations of Rule 8, and set sound policy). 
34. There are some interpretation-based critiques as well.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES 
THINK 53 (2008) (contending that the Court in Twombly could not possibly have based its decision 
on “legalist” principles); David Marcus, When Rules Are Rules: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and Institutions in Legal Interpretation, 2011 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 60–72), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1852856 (claiming that “[e]very relevant indicator suggests 
that the Court misinterpreted Rule 8 in Twombly and Iqbal ”); Spencer, supra note 16, at 448–50, 
461–73 (detailing the many ways in which the Twombly rule deviates from past practice, the text, 
the intent, and the legislative history of Rule 8). 
35. See Rakesh N. Kilaru, Comment, The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, Iqbal, and the Paradox of 
Pleading, 62 STAN. L. REV. 905 (2010) (arguing that heightened pleading might make sense for 
antitrust cases but not for all civil cases). 
36. See Spencer, supra note 16, at 452–54 (arguing that if the Court wishes to address discovery abuses 
it should do so directly). 
37. See Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited, supra note 16, at 878–79; Suzette M. Malveaux, Front 
Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal 
on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 84–92 (2010); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The 
Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment 
Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517 (2010) (claiming that Twombly and Iqbal have resulted 
in the disproportionate dismissal of civil rights cases); Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural 
Mismatches, and Civil Rights Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 157 (2010). 
38. See, e.g., Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 16, at 848–49; Herrmann, Beck & Burbank, supra note 
33, at 150–52 (Rebuttal Statement of Stephen Burbank). 
39. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010). 
40. See, e.g., JOE S. CECIL ET AL , MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER 
IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 
(2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf 
(concluding that from 2006 to 2010 there was an increase in the amount of motions to dismiss 
filed but not a general increase in their success); Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do 
Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 624 (2010) (“[A]fter Iqbal, [district 
courts] appear to be granting 12(b)(6) motions at a significantly higher rate than they did under 
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B. The Court as Drafter of the Civil Rules 
Although the Court did not initiate rulemaking to address the policy issues 
that it sought to resolve in Twombly and Iqbal, it has often relied upon that form, 
just as an agency would, in crafting significant Rules innovations.41  The court 
rulemaking process has evolved greatly over time into a complex affair that averages 
two to three years to complete.42  The rulemaking era began when Congress empo-
wered the Court to promulgate the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1934 with the 
passage of the Rules Enabling Act.43  Although the 1934 Act did not specify 
the use of committees, in 1935 the Court appointed a fourteen-person Advisory 
Committee—which did not adhere to the notice-and-comment procedures cur-
rently required of the Advisory Committee44—to do the research and drafting 
work for the creation of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.45  Under 
this first incarnation of the rulemaking process, the Court directly reviewed the 
work of the Advisory Committee and, if satisfied, reported the promulgated Rules 
to Congress,46 which could overrule any of the rules by exercising the legislative veto 
built into the 1934 Act during the specified “report-and-wait period.”47  Although 
the Court often deferred to the Advisory Committee’s proposals during this early 
  
Conley—which was already a sizeable 49% in the Database in the two-year period before 
Twombly.”); William M. Janssen, Iqbal “Plausibility” in Pharmaceutical and Medical Device 
Litigation, 71 LA. L. REV. 541, 644 n.400 (2011) (stating that the data show motions to dismiss 
increasing for the four months after Iqbal and then leveling out to normal numbers); Lonny 
Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An Assessment of the Federal Judicial Center’s Study of Motions 
to Dismiss (Univ. of Hous. Law Ctr., No. 1904134, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1904134. 
41. See, e.g., Richard Marcus, Not Dead Yet, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 299, 314–15 (2008) (pointing out that 
“[t]he federal rulemaking process has taken the lead in dealing with E-Discovery,” which “was the 
most prominent new issue in American litigation in the last decade”). 
42. See Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1655, 1671–72 (1995). 
43. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2006)); 
see also Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1103–18 (2002) (reviewing the most recent amendments to 
the rulemaking process).  For a detailed history of the Rules Enabling Act, see Stephen B. 
Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982). 
44. The innovation of notice-and-comment rulemaking was not a part of federal law until the passage 
of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946.  See infra notes 176–180 and accompanying text. 
45. See Order, Appointment of the Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity and Law Rules, 
295 U.S. 774 (1935) (initially appointing the Civil Rules Advisory Committee); see also Order, 297 
U.S. 731 (1936) (replacing a committee member and renewing the Advisory Committee’s charge). 
46. See Act of June 19, 1934 § 1, 48 Stat. at 1064 (“[T]he Supreme Court of the United States shall have 
the power to prescribe . . . for the district courts of the United States . . . the forms of . . . practice 
and procedure in civil actions . . . .”). 
47. See id. § 2, 48 Stat. at 1064. 
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period,48 it did on occasion exercise its authority to revise Advisory Committee 
proposals prior to submission to Congress.49  At least once, the Court exercised 
its rulemaking authority directly in amending a Rule of Criminal Procedure, 
bypassing the Advisory Committee entirely.50  
The rulemaking process become more reticulated in 1958 when Congress 
created the Judicial Conference of the United States, which took over the direct 
supervision of the Advisory Committee from the Court.51  This new structure 
resulted in decreased input into the rulemaking process by the Justices.52  Indeed, 
during this period, the Court unfailingly promulgated Rules recommended to it by 
the Judicial Conference, leading Justices and commentators to describe the Court’s 
role in rulemaking as one of being a “‘mere conduit’ for the work of others.”53 
By the late 1970s, observers of the rulemaking process, including Chief Justice 
Burger,54 leveled charges at every step in the process.  They argued that Congress’s 
review of the Rules was flawed.55  They similarly argued that the Court was not 
  
48. See Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 
STAN. L. REV. 673, 677 (1975) (“Although the Justices generally deferred to the Committee’s 
expertise during [this time], they at least read and, when appropriate, rejected proposed alterations.”). 
49. See Struve, supra note 43, at 1106 n.11 (listing Court-imposed revisions to rules promulgated by 
the Advisory Committee during this initial twenty-year period). 
50. See Charles E. Clark, The Role of the Supreme Court in Federal Rule-Making, 46 J. AM. JUDICATURE 
SOC. 250, 257 (1963).  Congress merged the Court’s civil and criminal rulemaking authority under 
one statute in 1988.  See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 
§ 404(a)(1), 102 Stat. 4642, 4651 (1988).  Nevertheless, the relevant criminal procedural rules enabl-
ing act then in force, Act of June 29, 1940, ch. 445, 54 Stat. 688, was sufficiently similar to the civil 
Rules Enabling Act to render the Court’s action relevant here.  See Struve, supra note 43, at 1106 n.12. 
51. See Struve, supra note 43, at 1107. 
52. See Friedenthal, supra note 48, at 677 (“The removal of the direct connection between the advisory 
committees and the Court appears to have caused deterioration . . . in the level of supervision exer-
cised by the Court.”). 
53. Id. at 685; see also Order of Apr. 29, 1980, 446 U.S. 997, 998 n.1 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(advising Congress to “bear in mind that our approval of proposed Rules is more a certification that 
they are the products of proper procedures than a considered judgment on the merits of the proposals 
themselves”); Order of Apr. 28, 1975, 421 U.S. 1022, 1022 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Order 
of Jan. 27, 1971, 400 U.S. 1031, 1036 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) (dissenting from promulgation of 
Rules of Procedure for the Trial of Minor Offenses Before United States Magistrates because 
“[w]ith our heavy caseload and the most crowded docket in history there is no use pretending that 
such rules can or do receive the careful, thoughtful attention of this Court”); 383 U.S. 1089, 1090 
(1966) (Douglas, J , dissenting in part).  At other times, however, Justice Douglas took a more involved 
approach to rule promulgation.  See, e.g., 409 U.S. 1132 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
54. See Warren E. Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary, 65 A.B.A. J. 358, 360 (1979). 
55. See Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 905, 
930 (1976). 
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an appropriate entity to promulgate Rules.56  Commentators chastised the com-
mittee structure as acting beyond the bounds of the Rules Enabling Act57 and 
for being unrepresentative and closed to public input.58  The judiciary sought to 
correct many of these faults without new legislation by commissioning a Federal 
Judicial Center study, which, upon completion, suggested several amendments to 
the rulemaking process.59 
These changes, however, did not satisfy Congress, which passed significant 
rulemaking reforms in 1988.60  While retaining the Judicial Conference’s role in 
the rulemaking process, the 1988 Act codified the role of the rulemaking com-
mittees for the first time.  It mandated the existence of the Standing Committee 
on Rules of Practice and Procedure, which the Judicial Conference had previously 
established at its discretion, and charged the Standing Committee with reviewing 
the proposals of other duly appointed committees and making recommendations 
to the Judicial Conference.61  The 1988 Act also formalized the Judicial Conference’s 
practice of deploying area-specific advisory committees.62  Hence, the Court can 
only promulgate Rules that have been vetted by the area-specific advisory com-
mittees, the Standing Committee, and the Judicial Conference. 
The 1988 Act also increased representation and public participation in the 
rulemaking process.  The Act mandates that the various advisory committees 
include practitioners, trial judges, and appellate judges.63  Congress also mandated 
greater transparency and public input.  The Act thus requires the Judicial Conference 
to publish its procedures for amendment and adoption of rules.64  It further re-
  
56. See id. at 962 (contending that the Court does not possess the expertise and time required to engage 
effectively in rulemaking). 
57. See Struve, supra note 43, at 1108. 
58. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-422, at 16 (1987); Howard Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making Process: A 
Time for Re-examination, 61 A.B.A. J. 579 (1975). 
59. See McCabe, supra note 42, at 1661–62.  This study, published in 1983, resulted in several reforms, 
including increased public notice and the publication of decisions at various stages of the rulemaking 
process—changes that increased the transparency of the rulemaking process.  See Procedures for the 
Conduct of Business by the Judicial Conference Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 98 
F.R.D. 337 (1983). 
60. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988) 
(current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2075).  With the exceptions of amendments relating to the 
ability of rules to define finality for purposes of appellate jurisdiction, see Civil Justice Reform Act 
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 315, 104 Stat. 5089, 5115, and the addition of circumstances 
subject to interlocutory appeals, see Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
572, § 101, 106 Stat. 4506, 4506, Congress has not tinkered with the rulemaking process since 1988. 
61. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (2006). 
62. Id. § 2073(a)(2). 
63. Id. 
64. Id. § 2073(a)(1). 
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quires that the Advisory and Standing Committees conduct open and publicly 
noticed meetings, record the minutes, and make those minutes publicly availa-
ble.65  Additionally, the 1988 Act codified the longstanding practice of the Ad-
visory Committee to attach official drafters’ notes to Rule proposals.66  Finally, 
the 1988 Act increased the length of the report-and-wait period to Congress.  The 
period now stands at a minimum of seven months.67 
Thus, the current rulemaking process comprises seven steps.68  First, the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts collects recommendations for 
new Rules or amendments from the public, practitioners, and judges.69  These 
suggestions are forwarded to the appropriate Advisory Committee’s reporter70 (a 
law professor assigned to each advisory committee to set the agenda and do the 
initial drafting of rule revisions and explanatory notes71), who makes an initial 
recommendation for action to the Advisory Committee.  Second, to go forward 
with a Rules revision, the Advisory Committee must submit the proposed revi-
sion and explanatory note, and any dissenting views, to the Standing Committee 
in order to obtain permission to advance to the publication and comment period.72  
Third, the Advisory Committee publishes the proposed revision widely, receives 
public comment, and holds public hearings.73  At the conclusion of the notice-
and-comment period, the Advisory Committee’s reporter summarizes the results 
of the public input and presents them to the Advisory Committee.74  If the Ad-
visory Committee finds that no substantial changes to the revision are called for, 
it transmits the revision and accompanying notes and reports to the Standing 
Committee.75  If the Advisory Committee makes substantial changes to the 
  
65. Id. § 2073(c)(1)–(2). 
66. Id. § 2073(d). 
67. Id. § 2074(a).  Since the 1988 amendments, Congress has only rarely exercised its power to halt or 
revise Rules.  See Struve, supra note 43, at 1115.  For example, Congress enacted the provisions of 
what is now Federal Rule of Evidence 412 after the Court rejected proposed amendments to the 
rape shield evidentiary rule that the Judicial Conference approved (in one of the few instances where 
the Court did not rubberstamp the Judicial Conference’s work product).  See Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40141, 108 Stat. 1796, 1918 
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); McCabe, supra note 42, at 1661 n.36. 
68. See Procedures for the Conduct of Business by the Judicial Conference Committees on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure, 195 F.R.D. 386 (2000). 
69. See McCabe, supra note 42, at 1672. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 1664–65. 
72. Id. at 1672. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 1672–73. 
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proposed revision, it must go through another public notice-and-comment period.76  
Fourth, the Standing Committee reviews the proposed revision.77  If it makes sub-
stantial changes to the proposed revision, the Standing Committee returns the 
proposed revision to the Advisory Committee.78  If the Standing Committee 
does not make substantial changes, it sends the proposed revision to the Judicial 
Conference.79  Fifth, the Judicial Conference considers proposed revisions each 
September, sending approved revisions to the Court or rejected proposals back 
to the Standing Committee.80  Sixth, the Court takes the proposed revisions under 
advisement from September to May 1 of the following year, at which time it must 
transmit to Congress those Rules it seeks to promulgate.81  Seventh, under the 
current law, Congress’s report-and-wait period runs another seven months from 
May 1 to December 1, at which time unaltered revisions to the Rules become law.82 
C. Analogous Experiences of Agencies and the Court in Rulemaking 
Like most agencies, then, the Court in the civil procedure arena is an insti-
tution that sets policy.  It engages in this task, much as an agency would, with 
a discretionary docket and the choice of setting policy by way of adjudication 
or rulemaking.  Moreover, the history of the court rulemaking process and the 
prevailing views of its legitimacy are remarkably similar to that of administrative 
law, further bolstering the analogy between the Court in the civil procedure context 
and an administrative agency. 
While the campaign for a federal court rulemaking model was initiated by 
a famous speech from Roscoe Pound to the American Bar Association in 1906,83 
the Rules Enabling Act was not enacted until 1934 during the heart of the New 
Deal.84  The proponents of the court rulemaking model thought that the judiciary, 
  
76. Id. at 1673. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (2006). 
82. Id.  If Congress decides to reject or modify proposed changes to the Rules during this period, it must 
promulgate a joint resolution that satisfies the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and 
presentment.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 935 n.9 (1983) (“The 
[Rules Enabling Act] did not provide that Congress could unilaterally veto the Federal Rules.  
Rather, it gave Congress the opportunity to review the Rules before they became effective and to 
pass legislation barring their effectiveness if the Rules were found objectionable.”).   
83. See Bone, The Process of Making Process, supra note 16, at 893–94; Jay Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, 
and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513 (2006). 
84. See Burbank, supra note 43 (providing a comprehensive historical treatment). 
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rather than the legislature, should promulgate the Rules because they believed in 
a sharp dichotomy between substance and procedure and trusted that courts would 
devise sound procedural rules through the application of “neutral expertise.”85  
This view largely prevailed during the 1950s and 1960s, which corresponded 
with a period of significant consensus in favor of legal process theory in American 
public law and resulted in “the golden age of court rulemaking.”86  When the pre-
vailing societal consensus collapsed, and law (including procedural law) became 
viewed as inherently political, Congress revised the court rulemaking process87 in 
an effort to ensure the representation of all affected interests in the legislative 
process of promulgating Rules.88  Despite those reforms, the legitimacy of the court 
rulemaking process has been repeatedly challenged since the 1980s on the grounds 
that the relevant decisionmakers are unelected and therefore politically unaccounta-
ble and because the policy choices of the rulemakers are not subject to sufficient 
political control.89  Meanwhile, proponents of court rulemaking worry that increased 
participation rights and multiple levels of review have made the process unduly bur-
densome and inefficient, resulting in increased use of adjudication to set policy.90  
In other words, critics of court rulemaking complain that unaccountable public 
  
85. As Robert Bone has explained, judges were viewed as neutral experts immune from political pressures 
and thus assumed to render more rational and fair systemic rules.  See Bone, The Process of Making 
Process, supra note 16, at 896; see also Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of 
Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1708 (2004) (“[I]t cannot have hurt that the delegation 
and the rhetoric used to support [the Rules Enabling Act] were consistent with the ethos of the 
emerging administrative state.”); Laurens Walker, The End of the New Deal and the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1269, 1272–80 (1997). 
86. See Bone, The Process of Making Process, supra note 16, at 897–99. 
87. See supra notes 54–67 and accompanying text. 
88. See Bone, The Process of Making Process, supra note 16, at 902–07 (describing the decline of the court 
rulemaking model and explaining that “[t]he result is a shift away from a model based on expertise 
and toward one based on representation and accommodation of competing interest groups”); Burbank, 
supra note 85, at 1711; Walker, supra note 15, at 472; Walker, supra note 85, at 1285. 
89. See, e.g., Bone, The Process of Making Process, supra note 16, at 907–09 (describing the modern 
justificatory dilemma of court rulemaking, recognizing its similarity to the problems of legitimacy 
with the administrative state, and explaining that critics use concerns about legitimacy and efficacy 
“to demand changes in rulemaking procedures, to object to particular rules, and to call for greater 
congressional involvement”); Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining 
the Judiciary’s Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1191, 1211–14 (1996). 
90. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change: Who, How, Why, and When?, 49 
ALA. L. REV. 221, 244–46 (1997) (recognizing the analogy between the ossification of informal 
rulemaking in administrative law and similar problems with court rulemaking and pointing out that 
“[t]he use of case-by-case adjudication to circumvent or preempt court rulemaking obstacles posed by 
the Enabling Act process is not unknown”); Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 229, 229 (1998) (“[W]e should reduce the encrustation of steps in the 
[court rulemaking] process, returning it to essentially two steps before presentation to Congress.”). 
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officials are making discretionary policy choices, while proponents of court rulemak-
ing worry that prior legislative reforms have resulted in the ossification of this 
desirable process. 
The legitimacy of the administrative state has experienced a very similar histo-
rical development.  The New Deal era was characterized by a progressive belief 
in the ability of administrators to solve social problems identified by the legisla-
ture through the application of neutral expertise.91  The disciples of legal process 
theory were largely comfortable with broad delegations of lawmaking authority 
from Congress to agencies with limited political interference and deferential 
judicial review of agency policy decisions.92  This belief in neutral expertise 
waned over the next several decades, reflecting a loss of faith in the objectivity of 
science, a recognition that agencies were necessarily making value judgments in 
the course of implementing their statutory authority, and a growing belief that 
democracy required such decisions to be resolved in a manner consistent with the 
will of the majority.93  Moreover, there was an increased recognition of the impor-
tance of the influence of interest groups in a pluralistic democracy and a growing 
concern that agencies were vulnerable to being captured by the interests they 
were ostensibly charged with regulating.94  Accordingly, administrative law shifted 
during the late 1960s and 1970s toward the interest group representation model, 
which sought to provide “a surrogate political process to ensure the fair repre-
sentation of a wide range of affected interests in the process of administrative 
decision.”95  During the past quarter century, this model has been criticized, in 
part, for its failure to ensure that agency policy decisions are subject to sufficient 
political control and also for imposing unduly burdensome procedural requirements 
on agencies, which many argue resulted in the ossification of the rulemaking 
process96 and created the same ossification concerns raised by the court rulemak-
ing process.  While the interest group representation model still has a place in 
  
91. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1667, 1677–78 (1975). 
92. See Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 567, 576–
83 (1992). 
93. See Stewart, supra note 91, at 1681–87; see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: 
Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 475–85 (2003) 
(describing the majoritarian underpinnings of the interest group representation model). 
94. See Stewart, supra note 91, at 1711–13. 
95. Id. at 1670. 
96. See Bressman, supra note 93, at 485–91 (describing the shortcomings of the interest representation 
model and the transition to presidential control); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2269–2319 (2001). 
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administrative law, those criticisms have ensured that its place is not at the center 
of the modern regulatory state’s legitimacy.97  
While the analogy is not seamless,98 four key features demonstrate the si-
milarity between administrative agencies and the Court in the civil procedure 
context.  First, both agencies and the Court have been delegated authority to 
make policy in their respective fields through orders entered in adjudication.  
Second, both agencies and the Court have been delegated authority to make policy 
through notice-and-comment rulemaking.  Third, because the law does not typi-
cally compel these institutions to make policy through a particular procedural 
vehicle, both agencies and the Court routinely confront choice-of-policymaking-
form decisions.  Fourth, the historical parallels, and accompanying ideas of legiti-
macy, between agency rulemaking and court rulemaking strengthen our thesis 
that the Court functions as an administrative agency in the field of civil procedure.  
As these four points illustrate, our administrative law analogy rests upon the 
Court’s choice of policymaking form—not the Court’s mere policy-setting func-
tion.  That is, we fully recognize that the Court’s opinions routinely set policy in 
other areas just as they do in Rules cases.  Thus, it is this ability to deploy rulemak-
ing in the civil procedure context that we contend is most salient for our analogy.99 
  
97. See Bressman, supra note 93, at 485; infra Part IV.C (discussing contemporary theories of legitimacy). 
98. For example, the current court rulemaking model is best described as a bottom-up process, whereas 
agency rulemaking is traditionally described as a top-down process.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Public Law From the Bottom Up, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 141, 173–74 (1994).  Additionally, the court 
rulemaking process lacks hard-look review.  This was not always the case, however.  Under the 1934 
version of the Rules Enabling Act, Congress empowered the Court to exercise direct and exclusive 
control over the Advisory Committee that was accompanied with, if not hard-look review, at least 
a more rigorous oversight than is found today.  See supra notes 43–50 and accompanying text.  
Moreover, we advocate for statutory reforms that would lead to greater involvement by the Justices 
both in initiating rulemakings and reviewing the final products of these rulemakings, thus strength-
ening our agency analogy, see infra Part IV, and resulting in a hybrid bottom-up and top-down 
model.  Cf. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital Age, 
88 TEX. L. REV. 669, 729–39 (2010) (proposing a “dynamic model of regulation” based upon 
the insight that “purely top-down regulatory solutions are ill fitted to risk management and 
unchanneled bottom-up solutions fall short of public goals”).  We discuss other gaps in the analogy 
below.  See infra notes 265–273 and accompanying text. 
99. This is not to say that our position favoring rulemaking might not have implications for matters of 
statutory construction or review of administrative decisions.  We reserve those discussions for the 
time being and do not intend, in this Article, to critique the Court’s policymaking by adjudication 
in other areas. 
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II. THE LESSONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—THE SUPERIORITY 
OF RULEMAKING 
Concluding, as we do, that the Court functions much like an agency in the 
Rules context, it is apt to consider administrative law best practices when discussing 
how the Court should handle its civil procedure regulatory task.  Because it is widely 
recognized that agencies can make policy decisions through rulemaking or adju-
dication, an agency’s choice of policymaking form has received a great deal of 
attention in administrative law scholarship.100  This literature recognizes the 
“obvious point” that “the agency makes an important choice when it selects the poli-
cymaking form its actions will take.”101  An agency’s choice of policymaking form 
is important because rulemaking and adjudication have distinct advantages and 
drawbacks as policymaking vehicles.  The conventional wisdom in administrative 
law, however, is that rulemaking is the superior policymaking form in the vast 
majority of circumstances.  Administrative law scholars have therefore advocated 
greater use of rulemaking by agencies and articulated criteria that should guide 
an agency’s choice of policymaking form.102  This Part begins by describing these 
lessons of administrative law and explaining how they are broadly applicable 
to the Supreme Court’s choice of policymaking form in the civil procedure context.  
We then draw upon these lessons to suggest that the Court should adopt a pre-
sumption in favor of making policy decisions in the field of civil procedure though the 
rulemaking process, a presumption that should only be rebutted in cases that involve 
legal issues that can be resolved through traditional tools of statutory interpretation. 
  
100. For a sampling of this literature, see Warren E. Baker, Policy by Rule or Ad Hoc Approach—Which 
Should It Be?, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 658 (1957); Richard K. Berg, Re-examining Policy 
Procedures: The Choice Between Rulemaking and Adjudication, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 149 (1986); 
Arthur Earl Bonfield, State Administrative Policy Formulation and the Choice of Lawmaking 
Methodology, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 121 (1990); Ronald A. Cass, Models of Administrative Action, 72 
VA. L. REV. 363 (1986); Ralph F. Fuchs, Development and Diversification in Administrative Rule 
Making, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 83 (1977); William T. Mayton, The Legislative Resolution of the 
Rulemaking Versus Adjudication Problem in Agency Lawmaking, 1980 DUKE L.J. 103; Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, Rulemaking Versus Adjudication: A Psychological Perspective, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 529 
(2005); Glen O. Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and 
Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1970); David L. Shapiro, 
The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. 
REV. 921 (1965); J. Skelly Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial 
Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375 (1974); and Antonin Scalia, Back to Basics: Making Law 
Without Making Rules, REGULATION, July/Aug. 1981, at 25.  See also Magill, supra note 9, at 
1403 n.69 (collecting sources). 
101. Magill, supra note 9, at 1397. 
102. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 100. 
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A. The Superiority of Rulemaking in Administrative Law 
We begin with a review of rulemaking in administrative law.  When the 
regulatory state was expanded during the New Deal, it was generally expected that 
administrative agencies would continue the traditional practice of implementing 
their statutory mandates primarily through case-by-case adjudication.103  The 
use of notice-and-comment rulemaking, however, eventually increased “with such 
speed that by the early 1970s commentators declared that the administrative state 
had entered the ‘age of rulemaking.’”104  Then-Professor Antonin Scalia wrote in 
1978 that “perhaps the most notable development in federal government admin-
istration during the past two decades” has been “the constant and accelerating flight 
away from individualized, adjudicatory proceedings to generalized disposition 
through rulemaking.”105  Part of the explanation for this development is that agen-
cies, courts, and commentators recognized that, in many situations, “rulemaking 
has definite advantages over adjudication as a tool for agency lawmaking and 
policymaking”106—many of which apply to the Court as a rulemaker. 
First, rulemaking is widely viewed as a better procedure than adjudication for 
making policy and exploring issues of legislative fact because the Administrative 
Procedure Act of 1946’s (APA) informal rulemaking procedures are specifically 
designed for this purpose.107  This advantage is directly applicable to the court 
rulemaking functions—as explained above, the latest version of the Rules Enabling 
Act largely mimics the APA.108  We elaborate upon this point in the following 
Part, which discusses our proposed criteria for triggering court rulemaking.109 
A second advantage of rulemaking over adjudication in administrative law 
is that anyone who is interested can participate in rulemaking, while adjudication 
  
103. See Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking’s Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the 1960s and 
1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139, 1145–46 (2001). 
104. Id. at 1147 (quoting Wright, supra note 100, at 376). 
105. Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 SUP. CT. 
REV. 345, 376. 
106. MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
192 (3d ed. 2009). 
107. See supra notes 68–76 and accompanying text. 
108. See ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 106, at 193 (“[T]he procedures of rulemaking have been 
designed for the precise purpose of exploring issues of law, policy, and legislative fact.”); see also 1 
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR , ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.8, at 369 (4th ed. 2002) (claiming 
that, for this reason, the product of rulemaking “almost certainly will be instrumentally superior to 
any ‘rule’ produced by the process of adjudicating a specific dispute”). 
109. See infra Part III. 
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is generally limited to the parties in a case.110  This advantage has both formal 
and functional dimensions.  From a formal perspective, an order entered during 
adjudication can result in the creation of precedent that binds parties in subsequent 
cases, even though those parties had no opportunity to participate in the formu-
lation of the law or policy at issue.111  Conversely, everyone who receives notice of 
a proposed rulemaking is invited “to participate in the rule making through 
submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for 
oral presentation.”112  Moreover, hard-look judicial review ensures that agencies 
consider and respond to the significant comments in the administrative record 
and that they take competing interests and perspectives into account during the 
rulemaking process.113  From a functional perspective, the rulemaking proceedings 
of administrative agencies are far more visible and attract substantially more public 
attention than the vast majority of individual cases.114  This means that ordinary 
citizens, interest groups, and elected officials are more likely to know that an 
important legal or policy issue is on the agency’s agenda during the rulemaking 
process.115  They can therefore mobilize and seek to influence the agency’s legal 
and policy decisions.116  Indeed, the APA requires agencies to give advance notice 
of proposed rulemaking and thereby limits the extent to which they can resolve 
unanticipated issues in their final rules,117 whereas the precise content of adjudica-
tory orders frequently depends upon the potentially idiosyncratic concerns of the 
parties and agency decisionmakers and is therefore relatively unpredictable.118 
  
110. See ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 106, at 192–93; PIERCE, supra note 108, § 6.8, at 368–69. 
111. See ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 106, at 192–93. 
112. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006). 
113. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 61–64 (1985) 
(explaining how the hard-look doctrine promotes principles of deliberative democracy). 
114. See PIERCE, supra note 108, § 6.8, at 369–70. 
115. See Shapiro, supra note 100, at 940 (recognizing that rulemaking is generally more accessible than 
adjudication and claiming that “the enunciation of rules in adjudicatory proceedings frequently has 
the effect of ‘hiding the ball’ from those who are not initiated into the mysteries of a particular 
agency and its works”). 
116. See ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 106, at 193; PIERCE, supra note 108, § 6.8, at 369–70; see also 
Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987). 
117. See, e.g., Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1985) (invalidating a final rule 
that was not a “logical outgrowth” of the agency’s proposed rule). 
118. See PIERCE, supra note 108, § 6.8, at 368–69. 
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These participatory119 and transparency120 advantages apply to court rulemak-
ing as well, although not as starkly as in the agency context.  The high visibility of 
the Court’s work and the potential to file amicus briefs121 mitigate some of the 
participatory and transparency issues in agency policy setting.  Nevertheless, there 
are likely to be fewer surprises and a much broader range of participation in court 
rulemaking than in adjudication, and rulemaking includes the opportunity for a 
legislative veto.  Twombly, in particular, demonstrates how the Court can use 
adjudication to make dramatic changes to the Rules without providing advance 
notice or a meaningful opportunity to participate.122 
A third advantage of rulemaking over adjudication is that the former method 
of making policy gives agencies greater control over their own agendas, allowing 
them to set priorities more easily and to implement their programmatic respon-
sibilities rationally.123 In adjudication, by contrast, an agency’s agenda may be dic-
tated by the happenstance of whatever cases come before it.  Even if the agency 
has discretion over which cases to pursue, the facts of any particular test case may 
not turn out as the agency had anticipated.124  In addition, an agency’s use of 
rulemaking to make law or policy provides the opportunity to adopt a far more 
comprehensive solution to any particular problem than is frequently available 
through adjudication.125  This is particularly true when an agency’s policy decisions 
  
119. See Struve, supra note 43, at 1126 (explaining that “[a] court faced with an interpretive question in 
the context of litigation could not . . . provide [the] extensive opportunities for public input” that 
are offered by the court rulemaking process); Sellers, supra note 16, at 365; Spencer, supra note 16, 
at 454. 
120. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2073–2074 (2006); Spencer, supra note 16, at 454 (emphasizing that court 
rulemaking’s notice-and-comment procedures shine “more light on the proposals, meaning that 
any politically difficult changes will receive scrutiny and that opponents will have the opportunity 
to voice their concerns to the Committee or ultimately to Congress”). 
121. See Rebecca Haw, Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act: Why Antitrust Needs a New Deal, 89 TEX. L. 
REV. 1247 (2011) (claiming that extensive reliance on amicus briefs “makes Supreme Court antitrust 
adjudication analogous to administrative notice-and-comment rulemaking” and arguing that while 
this approach may improve upon the traditional judicial model, “it cannot realize the full benefits of 
APA rulemaking”). 
122. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 16, at 847 (claiming that “a thorough airing of the choices” 
did not accompany Twombly or Iqbal because “[t]he Court had given no forewarning adequate to 
generate public discussion” and “[t]he complicated issues were not sufficiently developed by lower-
court percolation, by academic or empirical studies, or even by parties’ position-taking”). 
123. See ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 106, at 193–94. 
124. See id. 
125. See Cass, supra note 100, at 394 (explaining that adjudication is generally understood to represent 
“a commitment to the incremental resolution of problems,” while rulemaking “entails the comp-
rehensive disposition of a large number of related claims”). 
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involve structural reforms or tradeoffs between competing policy goals.126  
Agencies typically have fewer options or alternatives when they resolve issues 
pursuant to adjudication because this policymaking form, by definition, proceeds 
on a piecemeal, case-by-case basis.  While rulemaking can be time consuming 
and expensive, agencies are able to use this policymaking vehicle to resolve issues 
in a comprehensive fashion in a single proceeding, instead of litigating similar 
issues in multiple cases that often lead to less coherent results.127  Accordingly, 
rulemaking is often a more efficient policymaking form than adjudication.128 
While the Court’s discretionary docket already affords it control over its 
agenda,129 the court rulemaking process, like agency rulemaking, provides the 
potential for more comprehensive solutions to policy disputes than the Court can 
adopt through adjudication.130  Indeed, procedural issues routinely involve the 
types of structural reforms or tradeoffs between competing policy goals that are 
more coherently and effectively addressed through rulemaking.131  For example, 
Catherine Struve has pointed out that the Court construed Rule 11 in an adju-
dication so as not to allow sanctions against the law firm of an attorney who 
committed misconduct, despite strong policy arguments for a contrary result.132  
Rule 11 was subsequently amended, however, both to allow sanctions against the 
law firm of an attorney who commits misconduct and to provide a twenty-one-
day safe harbor within which corrective action can be taken and sanctions there-
by avoided.133  As Struve explains, the Court could not adopt this solution pur-
suant to adjudication.134  Similarly, some scholars have suggested that the best 
solution to the concerns that animated the Court’s decisions in Twombly and 
Iqbal would be the adoption of a heightened standard of pleading and the crea-
  
126. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 12 
(2004) (recognizing that “[a]lmost every law tackles multiple problems at once” and that, in 
contrast to adjudication, “agencies can and do make multi-dimensional decisions” when they 
promulgate rules). 
127. See ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 106, at 194. 
128. See PIERCE, supra note 108, § 6.8, at 370–72. 
129. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the discretionary nature of the Court’s 
docket).  Moreover, the role of other actors, including the Advisory Committee, Standing Committee, 
Judicial Conference, and Congress, in the court rulemaking process suggests that the Court has 
less control over its agenda and the decisions that it reaches in rulemaking than it does in adjudication. 
130. See Sellers, supra note 16, at 368 (“[T]he Advisory Committee can make systematic changes to the 
Rules and, if necessary, amend several Rules at once.”); Spencer, supra note 16, at 454; Struve, 
supra note 43, at 1140. 
131. See supra notes 123–128 and accompanying text. 
132. See Struve, supra note 43, at 1120–24. 
133. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
134. See Struve, supra note 43, at 1123. 
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tion of a shorter and more focused discovery period prior to ruling on a defen-
dant’s motion to dismiss a complaint.135  The merits of this specific proposal 
aside, our point is that the Court could not adopt a comprehensive solution of 
this nature pursuant to adjudication. 
Fourth, rulemaking is also widely understood to be fairer than adjudication 
to groups who are adversely affected by agency action.136  First, the orders entered 
by agencies pursuant to adjudication typically apply retroactively to conduct that 
occurred before the agency’s decision, whereas regulations promulgated by agen-
cies pursuant to rulemaking are typically prospective in nature.137  Thus, rulemaking 
provides citizens with advance notice of their legal rights and obligations, which 
may be lacking when agencies enforce, for example, broad statutory prohibitions 
on unfair or deceptive business practices against particular conduct for the first 
time during adjudication.138  Such notice facilitates planning by promoting pre-
dictability and stability within the legal system.139  Moreover, generally applica-
ble agency rules tend to apply uniformly to a defined class of conduct or relatively 
large group of regulated entities, while the orders entered pursuant to adjudication 
can only be enforced directly against adverse parties to the proceedings.140  Accor-
dingly, rulemaking tends to promote the similar treatment of similarly situated 
persons and reduce arbitrary discrimination, thereby promoting values underlying 
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution.141  Of course, 
an agency’s arbitrary exercise of its enforcement discretion might still undermine 
those values, but individual nonenforcement decisions are a form of agency adju-
dication.142  In any event, agency regulations tend to be much more visible and 
easy to locate and understand than adjudicatory orders (even for nonlawyers!).143  
  
135. See, e.g., Ray Worthy Campbell, Getting a Clue: Two Stage Complaint Pleading as a Solution to the 
Conley-Iqbal Dilemma, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV 1191 (2010). 
136. See PIERCE, supra note 108, § 6.8, at 372–74. 
137. See ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 106, at 193. 
138. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
139. See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 976 (1995). 
140. See ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 106, at 193. 
141. See Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001, 1028–43 (2006) (describing the 
constitutional norms of fairness and equality); Sunstein, supra note 139, at 974 (recognizing that rules 
have a tendency to reduce “bias, favoritism, or discrimination in the minds of people who decide 
particular cases”). 
142. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 653 (1985). 
143. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 
104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2154 (2004) (“[T]he CFR, periodically revised by agencies under 
their broad delegated authority with an eye to making the law more accessible and improving volun-
tary compliance, is something that even nonlawyers can often follow.”). 
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Rulemaking therefore facilitates political oversight of agency decisionmaking by 
elected officials and reinforces the advance notice that is provided to citizens of their 
legal rights and obligations.144 
Again, many of these benefits apply to the Rules promulgated by the 
Court.  Rules that the Court adopts pursuant to the rulemaking process are often 
prospective in nature, which means that litigants and nonparties have advance 
notice of their rights and obligations and the ability to plan accordingly.145  In 
contrast, the orders entered by the Supreme Court during adjudication typically 
apply retroactively to the parties, which means that a mistaken understanding of 
the applicable Rules, or even a good-faith interpretation of existing precedent, 
could undermine the party’s chances of prevailing in the litigation.146  Such adverse 
consequences can be avoided in some circumstances, depending upon the Rule in 
question and the status of the case.147  Thus, for example, the plaintiffs in Twombly 
and Iqbal could potentially move for leave to amend their complaints on remand 
in an effort to comply with the Court’s new pleading standard.148  Nonetheless, 
there are situations where a party will lose a case or become severely disadvan-
taged by the Court’s decision—a problem that could have been avoided if the law 
had been clarified pursuant to the court rulemaking process in the first instance.149 
B. A Presumption in Favor of Rulemaking 
Thus, while rulemaking is by no means a magic cure-all, the key lesson 
to be learned for present purposes is that the overwhelming consensus in ad-
  
144. See supra notes 113–115, 136–138 and accompanying text. 
145. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (2006) (setting forth an effective date for amendments to the rules). 
146. See supra notes 136–142 and accompanying text (discussing the retroactive nature of adjudication); cf. 
supra notes 21–40 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s dramatic change of course in Twombly 
and Iqbal). 
147. In Part IV of this Article, we advocate that revisions to the Rules should apply retroactively.  We 
do not believe our later stance undercuts the validity of the general proposition made here for 
several reasons.  First, as we discuss in Part IV, we believe that in this context vesting Court 
adjudications with retroactive application, but not rulemakings, would lead to odd incentives.  
Second, as we note in this Part, retroactive application in the rulemaking setting is not overly 
damning given the opportunity to remand.  Third, even when proposed changes to the Rules are 
applied retroactively, interested parties are given advance notice of this possibility during the course 
of the rulemaking process.  The Court does not necessarily provide this type of notice when it revises 
the Rules pursuant to adjudication.  See, e.g., supra note 122 and accompanying text (explaining that 
many of the issues resolved in Twombly were not addressed by the parties or subject to public debate). 
148. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). 
149. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (reversing a decision, which was based on 
earlier precedent, that summary judgment was inappropriate, and adopting a new standard for 
evaluating defendant’s motion). 
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ministrative law is that rulemaking is generally the superior policymaking 
form.150  Moreover, many of the advantages of rulemaking generally apply to 
the court rulemaking process.  As such, we argue that the Court should adopt a 
presumption in favor of resolving the issues presented by Rules cases through 
notice-and-comment rulemaking. 
Although we propose the adoption of a presumption in favor of rulemak-
ing on civil procedure issues, we do not challenge the Court’s inherent power, 
even when not coupled with statutory authority, to control court procedure by court 
order or by adjudication.151  Rather, we argue that notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing is normatively superior to adjudication in making civil procedure policy, just 
as the Court has recognized in the administrative law context.  Tracking 
this analogy, we argue that the Court should not feel compelled to mandate notice-
and-comment rulemaking on civil procedure issues, but the Court should expli-
citly adopt a strong preference for it.  As the Court explained in the administrative 
law context: 
Since the Commission, unlike a court, does have the ability to make new 
law prospectively through the exercise of its rule-making powers, it has 
less reason to rely upon ad hoc adjudication to formulate new standards 
of conduct within the framework of the Holding Company Act.  The 
function of filling in the interstices of the Act should be performed, as 
much as possible, through this quasi-legislative promulgation of rules 
to be applied in the future.152 
Similarly, one of the most common recommendations of leading administrative 
law scholars in the late 1950s and early 1960s was “to de-emphasize policy-making 
through case-by-case adjudications and instead shift to the definition of standards 
  
150. See PIERCE, supra note 108, § 6.8, at 368 (“Over the years, commentators, judges, and Justices 
have shown near unanimity in extolling the virtues of the rulemaking process over the process of 
making ‘rules’ through case-by-case adjudication.”); see also Magill, supra note 9, at 1403 n.69, 
1415 n.112 (reviewing the formative literature on this topic and reporting that “the bottom line” is 
that “agencies should rely on rulemaking much more often” than adjudication).  But cf. Robinson, 
supra note 100 (expressing indifference regarding the choice between rulemaking and adjudication). 
151. See, e.g., Rule, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 411, 413–14 (1792) (Jay, C.J.) (stating that while the “Court 
considers the practice of the courts of King’s Bench and Chancery in England, as affording 
outlines for the practice of this court,” it retained the power, without statutory authorization, to 
“from time to time, make such alterations therein, as circumstances may render necessary”); see also 
Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) xiii (1822) 
(adopting formal rules of equity practice); 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1001, at 2 n.2 (3d ed. 2002) (listing authorities 
supporting the Court’s inherent authority to craft procedural rules). 
152. Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1946). 
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through policy statements and rulemakings.”153  Congress, agencies, and courts 
were largely receptive to this prescription for reform, which helped lead to the 
age of rulemaking in the late 1960s and 1970s.154  During this period, leading 
commentators extolled the superiority of rulemaking over adjudication as a poli-
cymaking form.155  The Administrative Conference of the United States subse-
quently endorsed the proposition that “[w]here the agency is, in effect, announcing 
a future policy, we believe it generally is best to use the rulemaking process.”156  In 
1981, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws went even further and recom-
mended that states incorporate provisions into their APAs that would establish 
a general mandatory preference for agency lawmaking by rule and a general 
mandatory obligation for agencies to displace any lawmaking conducted through 
adjudication with subsequently enacted rules.157  The contemporary literature on 
administrative law does not seriously debate rulemaking’s superiority over adju-
dication as a lawmaking or policymaking form.158 
Of course, there is no reason to expect the Rules to be perfect just because 
the Court routed them through the rulemaking process.159  Moreover, Court adju-
dication is undoubtedly faster and less expensive than court rulemaking.160  Fi-
nally, there are tasks, such as the interpretation of the Rules in straightforward 
cases, for which the Court (as an adjudicatory body) enjoys institutional advan-
tages over the rulemaking process.  Accordingly, there will be a legitimate need for 
  
153. Schiller, supra note 103, at 1150; see HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR A BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 143–47 (1962); Baker, 
supra note 100; Fuchs, supra note 100; Cornelius J. Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the 
National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961); Shapiro, supra note 100. 
154. See Schiller, supra note 103, at 1147–52. 
155. See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 102, 219–
21 (1969); Wright, supra note 100, at 376 (“[W]hen Congress has adopted a regulatory solution, 
and when the Delegation Doctrine does not bar that solution, the case for making administrative 
policy through rules, rather than adjudicatory decisions, is overwhelming.” (emphasis omitted)). 
156. ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 83 (1983). 
157. See MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT § 2-104(3) to (4) (1981); see also Bonfield, supra note 
100 (advocating these requirements). 
158. Rather, there is widespread concern that stringent analytical requirements and external review 
mechanisms have ossified the rulemaking process, and commentators have therefore designed and 
proposed reforms to facilitate legislative rulemaking by agencies.  See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 17; 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59 (1995). 
159. See infra notes 313–322 and accompanying text (discussing problems with rules and advantages of 
adjudication). 
160. See Yeazell, supra note 90, at 235 (describing the difficulty of amending the Rules under today’s 
process and claiming that if one were to describe the process as “cumbersome,” it would be “a quite 
measured comment”).  We offer some reforms to ameliorate this concern in Part IV. 
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residual adjudication regarding the meaning and proper application of the Rules 
in particular cases. 
III. CHOOSING A POLICYMAKING FORM 
Having established the reasons for creating a presumption in favor of 
rulemaking on civil procedure issues, we now turn to the articulation of criteria 
detailing when this presumption should apply.  To that end, we offer three formu-
lations of what is likely but one notion: namely, that when the Court can decide 
a Rules case using traditional tools of statutory interpretation, efficiency and insti-
tutional advantages weigh in favor of resolution by adjudication.  We couch this 
idea, however, in administrative law terms on the theory that these bodies of 
law are sufficiently well developed to provide a rich source of meaningful guid-
ance for particular cases.  First, we contend that the Court should resolve civil 
procedure issues through notice-and-comment procedures when an interpre-
tation of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure rests substantially on legislative facts.  
Next, we argue that the Court should refer issues that arise in civil procedure 
cases to the court rulemaking process when those issues would be resolved pursuant 
to the second step of a Chevron-like inquiry.  Finally, we conclude that the Court 
should route to the Advisory Committee those civil procedure decisions that will 
produce policy pronouncements akin to legislative rules.  The presence of any one 
of these criteria should favor deploying the preference for civil procedure rulemak-
ing.  Conversely, only when all three criteria are lacking should resolution by 
adjudication be the best course. 
A. Legislative Facts v. Adjudicative Facts 
First, we contend that the Court should deploy notice-and-comment 
rulemaking when the issue before the Court rests, at least in large part, on a ques-
tion of legislative fact because this procedure is superior to the adjudicatory process 
for determining legislative facts.161  Courts have long distinguished between legis-
lative and adjudicative facts.162  While the distinction between legislative and 
  
161. See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 108, § 6.4.3, at 326 (explaining the distinction between adjudicative 
and legislative facts and how the adversary process enhances the accuracy of the former but not the 
latter); Kenneth Culp Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 941 (1980). 
162. See Lewis v. Rucker, [1761] 97 Eng. Rep. 769 (K.B.) 772 (recognizing the distinction and noting 
that the court was free to obtain legislative facts off the record “by conversing with some gentlemen 
of experience in adjustments”). 
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adjudicative facts may not be ironclad, generally speaking, adjudicative facts are 
those pertaining to the litigants, their activities, and their properties.163  That is, 
adjudicative facts are the historical facts of a dispute the determination of which 
traditionally falls within the province of the jury.164  Legislative facts, on the other 
hand, “are those [facts that] a tribunal seeks in order to assist itself in the legis-
lative process of creating law or determining policy.”165  Such facts are “general 
[in nature] and do not concern merely the immediate parties.”166 
Given the Supreme Court’s role as lawmaker, even in the adjudicatory form, 
it must often rely on legislative facts in rendering decisions.167  Despite this imper-
ative, the Court has consistently failed to adopt an effective means of obtaining 
reliable legislative facts on which to base its opinions.168  This is the case because 
trial courts, which create the record on which the Court bases its rulings, are 
themselves poor venues for determining legislative facts.169 
The reasons for this inadequacy parallel those given by administrative law 
scholars for the failure of formal rulemaking to acquire legislative facts.170  Formal 
  
163. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Official Notice, 62 HARV. L. REV. 537, 549 (1949) (providing the 
definitive modern treatment of the distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts); see also 
FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee’s note (adopting Davis’s distinction between adjudicative 
and legislative facts). 
164. FED. R. EVID. 201(a); see Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 244 n.52 (5th Cir. 
1976) (Brown, J., concurring). 
165. Davis, supra note 163, at 549. 
166. Id. 
167. See Prentis v. Atl. Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 227 (1908) (Holmes, J.) (“As the judge is bound to 
declare the law he must know or discover the facts that establish the law.”); BENJAMIN CARDOZO, 
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 128 (1921); Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Legal 
Positivism as Legal Information, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1080, 1108 & app. (1997) (documenting 
increased citation to nonlegal materials in Supreme Court cases over a number of terms). 
168. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A Proposed Research 
Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1, 9–11 (1986) (reviewing seven different approaches 
the Court has deployed to solve the difficulty of determining legislative facts and concluding: 
“[N]othing it can do is as satisfactory as what . . . an agency would normally do, for the Supreme 
Court has no properly qualified staff to make an appropriate study or investigation of legislative 
facts . . . . The conclusion is overwhelming that the Supreme Court lacks the essential institutional 
arrangement for developing the legislative facts on which some of its lawmaking should rest.”). 
169. See, e.g., Usery, 531 F.2d at 244 (Brown, J., concurring) (“And it is the capacity of an administrative 
agency to marshal the abundant material from all aspects of a given industrial activity that gives to 
this important governmental machinery its acceptable expertise [over trial courts].”). 
170. Rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) may be “informal,” see 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553 (2006), or “formal,” see id. §§ 556–557.  Informal rulemaking proceeds by the publication of a 
proposed rule, receipt and consideration of comments from the public, and issuance of the rule with 
a statement of its basis and purpose.  Id. § 553(c).  Formal rulemaking follows the same format except 
that instead of receipt and consideration of comments, the agency must hold oral evidentiary hearings 
similar to a trial.  Id. §§ 556–557. 
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rulemakings are attempts, via oral hearing and cross-examination, to determine 
legislative facts that will inform the substance of an administrative rule (that is, 
they are attempts to discern background facts against which to legislate).171  Such 
attempts have been unmitigated disasters because this adversarial format, when 
not limited to the determination of the historical facts of a particular dispute, 
empowers opposing counsel near-unbounded leave to challenge every proposition.  
Agencies thus spend inordinate amounts of time and money establishing even the 
most rudimentary of legislative facts.172  Accordingly, “the near-universal result of 
requiring an agency to issue rules only through formal rulemaking [is that] the 
agency abandons any effort to issue rules.”173  Similarly, the Court, in part as a 
consequence of the inability of trial courts to create records regarding legislative 
facts,174 tends to perform poorly in this regard when it is left to backfill necessary 
legislative facts while the case is on appeal.175 
Notice-and-comment rulemaking, on the other hand, is well suited to accu-
rately determining legislative facts.  Section 553 of the APA contains three basic 
requirements for legislative rulemaking.  First, an agency must publish advance 
notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register, setting forth the text of the 
agency’s proposal or a description of the relevant issues.176  Second, an agency must 
“give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through 
submission of written data, views, or arguments, with or without opportunity for 
oral presentation.”177  Third, the agency must publish its final rules with “a concise 
general statement of their basis and purpose,”178 which essentially requires the 
agency to provide a reasoned explanation for its decision based on the admin-
istrative record to withstand hard-look judicial review.179  Kenneth Culp Davis 
  
171. See PIERCE, supra note 108, § 7.2, at 419. 
172. See id. at 416–19; Robert W. Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: 
The Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1276, 1278–
1313 (1972) (“Another proceeding involving the standard of identity for peanut butter developed 
a transcript of over 7,700 pages, largely directed to the question whether the product peanut butter 
should consist of 90 percent peanuts or 87 ½ percent peanuts.”). 
173. PIERCE, supra note 108, § 7.2, at 417. 
174. The Court will on rare occasion remand to a trial court for development of legislative facts.  See, 
e.g., Borden’s Farm Prods. Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194 (1934). 
175. See Henry J. Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and Procedure, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 
37–38 (1978); Arthur Selwyn-Miller & Jerome A. Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, 
and the Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187 (1975); Ann 
Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND. L. REV. 111, 113 (1988). 
176. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006). 
177. Id. § 553(c). 
178. Id. 
179. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
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famously referred to this process as “one of the greatest inventions in modern gov-
ernment,”180 partly because it allows an agency to gather and consider any infor-
mation that is relevant to its policy decision. 
The widespread admiration for notice-and-comment procedures in admin-
istrative law has led some scholars to lament their absence from the Court’s 
process181 of determining legislative facts in cases on its general docket and to 
offer a string of second-best proposals.182  In suits dealing with the Rules, however, 
there is no need to settle for second best, given that the institutional advantages 
of rulemaking in collecting legislative facts apply with equal force to the court 
rulemaking process.183  After a Rules case has proceeded through a court of appeals, 
it will normally be apparent in the lower court opinion and the briefing whether 
a suit is dependent upon a determination of legislative facts.  In such instances, 
the Court should direct the Advisory Committee to initiate a notice-and-comment 
proceeding and thereby employ its institutional advantages in determining legis-
lative facts.  
The presence of questions of legislative facts as a factor for deploying a notice-
and-comment procedure is likely to be of special importance in cases where the 
Court is asked to overturn a past interpretation of a Rule.  This issue arises with 
some frequency, as the Twombly Court’s decision explicitly to overrule Conley 
during the course of adjudication illustrates.  As with its interpretation of sta-
tutes, the Court should be loath to overturn Rules precedents in an adjudicatory 
form184—especially where the basis for the overruling is a change in legislative 
facts—because notice-and-comment rulemaking provides a superior venue for 
making such a determination.185  Even if the Court rejected a statute-like rule of 
  
180. 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.1, at 448 (2d ed. 1978). 
181. See supra note 168 (citing scholarship noting the lack of notice-and-comment procedures at the 
Court); infra notes 182, 351 (citing proposals that suggest that the Court could deploy notice-and-
comment procedures even in the adjudicatory venue). 
182. See Davis, supra note 161, at 940 (“Although the Court in some circumstances may judicially 
notice legislative facts without having solid information about them, still when the facts are crucial in 
the lawmaking and either complex or doubtful the Court should normally make a choice between 
asking for factual briefs and remanding for factual development.”); supra note 175. 
183. See Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited, supra note 16, at 884 (“[T]he Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules can collect and process information, assess global effects, and compare different . . . options, [in 
addition to] invit[ing] public participation by holding hearings and soliciting written input.”). 
184. See Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991) (holding that once the Court has 
construed a statute, stability is the rule, and the Court “will not depart from [it] without some com-
pelling justification”); Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989) (holding 
that the Rules should be interpreted as if they were statutes). 
185. Cf. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989) (“Considerations of stare 
decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of 
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stare decisis in this context,186 and thereby treated its prior interpretations of the 
Rules as analogous to constitutional decisions, it should still refer issues that turn 
on legislative facts to the court rulemaking process.  The Court’s opinion in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey187 illustrates why this is so.  In 
Casey, the Court outlined those criteria it uses to determine when the doctrine 
of stare decisis might be overcome in constitutional cases.  The Court found four 
factors relevant: (1) the rule has proved to be unworkable, (2) the rule has created 
unique reliance interests, (3) the rule rests upon principles of law that have now 
been abandoned, and (4) the rule rests upon facts that have changed or come to 
be seen differently.188  Tellingly, workability, general reliance interests, and changes 
to background facts are all inquiries into legislative facts (that is, general facts that 
affect everyone, not historical facts pertaining to a particular dispute). 
Twombly presents a prime example of the role played by legislative facts in 
the civil procedure arena.  The Court based its decision to overrule Conley in large 
part on a legislative fact: “the threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious 
defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching” summary judgment.189  
Assuming this starting point, it would be worthwhile to know whether the costs 
and burdens of discovery are excessive, when this is true, if anything else could be 
done to address the problem, and the likely impact of a revised pleading standard 
on plaintiffs with valid causes of action.190  Yet no brief, not even an amicus brief, 
set forth any data to support the Court’s finding of this legislative fact.191  Indeed, 
reliance on untested folk wisdom is, unfortunately, a common feature of debates 
about discovery.  As “[t]wo Senior Researchers at the Federal Judicial Center 
  
constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter 
what we have done.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)–(c) advisory committee’s note (1993 amendments) 
(noting that the amended rule overturns Pavelic & LeFlore, which held that the 1983 version of Rule 
11 did not permit sanctions against the law firm of an attorney signing a groundless complaint). 
186. See infra note 220 (discussing Joseph Bauer’s and Karen Moore’s views that the Court should take 
a more expansive interpretive role in Rules cases). 
187. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
188. Id. at 854–59. 
189. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007). 
190. See Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited, supra note 16, at 883–84 (arguing that the Court “is not 
the optimal institution to design a strict pleading rule” because the requisite cost-benefit analysis 
“depends on empirical information about the frequency of meritless litigation, the difficulty of access 
to pre-filing information, the impact of litigation costs on government actors, and other factors,” 
which “[t]he Court is not in a good position to gather and process,” and because the Court is not well 
suited “to compare strict pleading to other methods for discouraging frivolous filings, such as 
penalties and fee shifting”); Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 16, at 853; Spencer, supra note 16, at 454. 
191. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 16, at 848 (reviewing the briefs filed and critiquing the Court for 
relying on unverified “folk wisdom”). 
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observed . . . ‘the debate over discovery reform [in the 1990s] has proceeded largely, 
but not entirely, with reference to salient personal experiences and not with ben-
efit of empirical evidence.’”192 
There are reasons, moreover, to believe that the Court relied upon an inac-
curate set of legislative facts in Twombly.193  In fact, reputable studies paint a far 
different picture of discovery costs.  For example, the Willging Study—one that 
the Twombly Court tangentially cited194—“found that the median total cost of 
litigation reported by attorneys in our sample was about $13,000 per client. . . . About 
half of this cost was due to discovery.”195  That is, median discovery costs in fed-
eral court in 1999 were around $6,500 per client.  Further, the study found that, in 
the vast majority of cases, discovery expenses were quite low relative to the amount 
at stake in the litigation.  The median cost of discovery was 3 percent of the stakes, 
although 5 percent of attorneys surveyed estimated discovery expenses at 32 percent 
or more of the amount at stake.196  Only 15 percent of attorneys reported that 
they believed the costs of discovery are too high.197  The 1998 RAND study came 
to similar conclusions.198  Prior to Twombly, the Advisory Committee, which had 
reviewed these and other studies, did not see the need to render wholesale revi-
sions to the discovery or pleading Rules.199 
 
 
  
192. Glenn S. Koppel, Reflections on the “Chimera” of a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure: The Virtue 
of Vision in Procedural Reform, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 971, 1002 (2009) (quoting Judith A. McKenna 
& Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on Civil Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785, 787 (1998)). 
193. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119 
(2002) (surveying empirical knowledge of civil procedure and demonstrating a significant disconnect 
between folk wisdom regarding procedure and the empirical data). 
194. The Court cited the Advisory Committee Report.  See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (citing 
Memorandum From Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Hon. Anthony 
J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 11, 1999), 192 F.R.D. 354, 
357 (2000) [hereinafter Advisory Committee Report]).  The Federal Judicial Center conducted 
the Willging study and reported to the Advisory Committee.  See Thomas E. Willging et al., An 
Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 
B.C. L. REV. 525, 525 n.* (1998). 
195. Willging et al., supra note 194, at 531. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND CORP., DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT: FURTHER ANALYSIS 
OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT EVALUATION DATA, at xxvii (1998), available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2009/MR941.pdf (“Discovery is not a pervasive 
litigation cost problem for the majority of cases.”). 
199. See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 194, at 357–61, 382–88 (predominantly proposing 
amendments to disclosure rules). 
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We are not necessarily defending the veracity of, or the methodologies 
employed by, the Willging and RAND studies.  Nor do we contend that improved 
empirical data alone will improve rulemaking.200  Rather, we assert that the Advisory 
Committee’s institutional capacity, like the capacity of agencies that engage in 
rulemaking generally, to generate and analyze the studies needed to produce such 
legislative facts as were relied upon by the Twombly Court far exceeds that of 
the Court sitting as an adjudicative body.201  The Court should avail itself of this 
institutional competence and route such cases to the Advisory Committee because 
findings by the Advisory Committee are more likely to be accurate across the 
broad spectrum of cases than are findings by the Court. 
B. Chevron Step One v. Chevron Step Two 
The Court should also refer issues that arise in civil procedure cases to the court 
rulemaking process when those issues would be resolved pursuant to the second 
step of a Chevron-like inquiry.  In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.,202 the Court adopted a two-step framework for reviewing the validity 
of an agency’s interpretation of its statutory authority.203  The first step of this 
inquiry focuses on “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question 
at issue.”204  The Court explained that “[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is 
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”205  Moreover, the Court explicitly 
  
200. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 
319, 319 (2008) [hereinafter Bone, Making Effective Rules] (arguing that empirical data, without a 
normative framework in which to place it, will not alone produce better rules); Bone, The Process of 
Making Process, supra note 16, at 915–16; Bryant G. Garth, Observations on an Uncomfortable 
Relationship: Civil Procedure and Empirical Research, 49 ALA. L. REV. 103, 103–13 (1997). 
201. See generally Thomas E. Willging, Past and Potential Uses of Empirical Research in Civil Rulemaking, 
77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121 (2002) (documenting efforts since the late 1980s by the Advisory 
Committee to solicit and otherwise encourage empirical studies regarding proposed rule changes).  
See also Clermont & Yeazell supra note 16, at 859 (“The rulemakers should soon commence a study 
of exactly where . . . the optimal pleading standard lies.”); Sellers, supra note 16, at 366 (recognizing 
that “the Advisory Committee can commission research into the costs and benefits of a proposed 
amendment” to the Rules); Struve, supra note 43, at 1140; The Supreme Court—Leading Cases, supra 
note 16, at 313. 
202. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
203. Id. at 842–44. 
204. Id. at 842. 
205. Id. at 842–43. 
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instructed that the requisite inquiry should be performed by “employing traditional 
tools of statutory construction.”206  As the Court explained: 
If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed 
the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own 
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an 
administrative interpretation.  Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous 
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the 
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.207 
In other words, the second step of the Chevron inquiry focuses on whether an 
agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision is “reasonable.”208 
While “forests have been laid waste to publish the outpouring of legal com-
mentary on [Chevron] and its progeny,”209 we merely want to utilize the basic 
conceptual distinction that underlies the two steps of this familiar analytical 
framework.  As Richard Pierce has explained, the first step of the Chevron inquiry 
focuses on ascertaining whether Congress has resolved a policy dispute in the 
course of enacting a statute.210  If so, then Congress has made “law” on the rele-
vant question, and agencies and the courts both must follow Congress’s instruc-
tions.211  However, because Congress has limited time and foresight, and a limited 
capacity to agree on the details of most socioeconomic legislation, it leaves open 
many policy questions.212  In this situation, which is governed by the second step 
of the Chevron framework, the institution that authoritatively resolves the pre-
cise question at issue is not engaged in “statutory interpretation” but rather is 
necessarily engaged in policymaking.213  In short, “Chevron is based on the Court’s 
recognition that giving meaning to ambiguous statutory language is policymak-
ing”214 and that “policy disputes within the scope of authority Congress has 
delegated to an agency are to be resolved by agencies rather than by courts.”215 
Similarly, our proposed use of the Chevron framework is premised on the 
view that when resolving civil procedure issues that arise in adjudication, federal 
  
206. Id. at 843 n.9. 
207. Id. at 843 (citations omitted). 
208. Id. at 844. 
209. Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry Into Agency 
Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 501 (2005). 
210. See PIERCE, supra note 108, § 3.3, at 142. 
211. See id. 
212. See id. at 142–43. 
213. See id. at 143. 
214. Id. at 147. 
215. Id. at 143. 
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courts are legally obligated to implement policy decisions that were made during 
the court rulemaking process.216  Thus, if the Court determines that an issue was 
directly addressed or unambiguously resolved during the court rulemaking process, 
“that is the end of the matter; for the court . . . must give effect to the unambi-
guously expressed intent” of the rulemakers.217  As when it applies the first step 
of Chevron, the Court should make this determination by employing traditional 
tools of statutory interpretation.  Thus, if the text of the Rule, its legislative history 
(including the relevant Advisory Committee Notes), and its underlying purpose 
clearly resolve an issue, then the issue is properly characterized as a question of “law,” 
which the Court should resolve pursuant to adjudication.  Put simply, if the Court 
would resolve a civil procedure issue under the first step of a Chevron analysis, 
then we believe that our presumption in favor of rulemaking would be overcome 
by both efficiency and institutional-advantage factors, and the Court would properly 
resolve the case pursuant to adjudication.  
Our proposed use of the Chevron framework also recognizes, however, that, 
like Congress (and other lawmakers), the drafters of the Rules do not explicitly 
resolve every issue that might subsequently arise when they promulgate new rules 
of civil procedure.218  Moreover, the resolution of these open issues cannot realis-
tically be characterized as a question of interpretation but rather involves poli-
cymaking by the relevant decisionmakers.  Thus, when the Court concludes that 
the rulemakers did not have an ascertainable intent with respect to the precise 
question at issue based on the application of traditional tools of statutory interpre-
tation, then it has no choice but to make civil procedure policy in resolving that 
issue.  The Court would defer to a reasonable resolution of a policy decision by an 
administrative agency under step two of Chevron in this situation, but that is not 
an available solution in this context.  Nonetheless, we believe that the Court could 
secure the same advantages by referring the resolution of ambiguities in the 
Rules to the court rulemaking process; the Court’s policy choices would thereby 
be made pursuant to a more democratic process with superior access to expertise.219  
  
216. Cf. Struve, supra note 43, at 1141 (“Both the structure of the Enabling Act and the actual rulemaking 
process, then, counsel restraint in the interpretation of the Rules: the Court should not reject authori-
tative sources of meaning in favor of its own policy conception of a desirable Rule.”). 
217. Cf. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
218. See Amanda Frost, Certifying Questions to Congress, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 16–23 (2007) (discussing 
the limits of interpretation and explaining that “many academics and some judges have openly admitted 
[that] no technique of interpretation can resolve every question of statutory ambiguity”). 
219. See supra Part II (discussing the superiority of rulemaking); Note, A Chevron for the House and Senate: 
Deferring to Post-Enactment Congressional Resolutions That Interpret Ambiguous Statutes, 124 HARV. 
L. REV. 1507, 1509–10 (2011) (“Because interpreting an ambiguous statute often requires a policy 
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We therefore contend that if the Court determines that the rulemakers have not 
directly addressed the precise question at issue, and the issue is therefore properly 
understood as a question of policy under step two of the Chevron framework, then 
the Court should refer the issue for resolution pursuant to the court rulemaking 
process, rather than resolving the issue pursuant to adjudication. 
To date, the Court has not adopted any consistent approach to interpreting 
the Rules.220  Rather, the Court sometimes applies a traditional interpretative 
methodology that is consistent with the resolution of issues pursuant to an inquiry 
that resembles the first step in a Chevron analysis.221  Other times, the Court adopts 
a policy-orientated approach to the interpretation of the Rules, which seems com-
parable to the manner in which agencies might resolve statutory ambiguities in 
cases that would be decided under step two of Chevron.  In addition to Twombly, 
Iqbal, and Marek v. Chesny,222 this latter approach is illustrated by the Court’s 
decision in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.223  There, the plaintiff voluntarily 
dismissed its antitrust complaint filed by counsel—Cooter & Gell.224  Before 
the case was dismissed, however, the district court held a Rule 11 hearing on the 
defendant’s motion that the complaint lacked sufficient basis in fact, but it did 
not grant the motion until three and a half years after the case was dismissed.225  
Although neither the text nor the legislative history of Rule 11 addressed such after-
dismissal sanctions—that is, the Court faced a Chevron-step-two ambiguity—the 
  
judgment, the rationale underlying Chevron is that agencies are better policymakers than courts are 
due to agencies’ greater political accountability and technical expertise.” (footnote omitted)). 
220. See Marcus, supra note 34, (manuscript at 4) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s interpretive methodologies 
for the Federal Rules vacillate wildly and inexplicably.”).  Some scholars, noting that the Court is 
empowered to promulgate the Rules, call for the Court to take a more assertive stance in liberally 
interpreting the Rules.  See, e.g., Joseph P. Bauer, Schiavone: An Un-Fortune-ate Illustration of the 
Supreme Court’s Role as Interpreter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
720, 720 (1988); Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1093 (1993).  Others assert that the more elaborate 
nature of the court rulemaking process counsels in favor of a more restrained interpretive stance in 
resolving ambiguities in the Rules.  See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 34; Struve, supra note 43, at 1169. 
221. See, e.g., Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters, Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 540 (1991); 
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp , 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1993 amendments) (“We give the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain 
meaning, . . . and generally with them as with a statute, ‘[w]hen we find the terms . . . unambiguous, 
judicial inquiry is complete.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 
430 (1981))). 
222. 473 U.S. 1 (1984); see supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing these examples). 
223. 496 U.S. 384 (1990). 
224. Id. at 389. 
225. See id. 
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Court affirmed the sanction as permitted by Rule 11.226  The Court’s ruling was 
roundly criticized, however, and swiftly reversed by the 1993 amendments to 
Rule 11.227  The Court’s resolution of this rule ambiguity during the course of 
adjudication, then, resulted not only in a poorly interpreted rule228 but in the 
embarrassment of a swift reversal that was accompanied by the Court’s acquies-
cence.229  Our proposal suggests that the Court should not have resolved the is-
sues presented in the foregoing cases pursuant to adjudication in the first place, 
but should instead have referred the issues directly to the court rulemaking process.230 
One potential objection to this aspect of our proposal would focus on the 
apparent difficulty of applying the Chevron framework in a clear and consistent 
fashion.231  There are two related components of this difficulty relevant to our 
present purposes.  First, federal courts do not always agree on precisely what the 
application of traditional tools of statutory interpretation entails;232 nor do they al-
ways apply their preferred interpretive methodologies in a consistent fashion under 
  
226. See id. at 395 (“The view more consistent with Rule 11’s language and purposes, and the one 
supported by the weight of Circuit authority, is that district courts may enforce Rule 11 even after the 
plaintiff has filed a notice of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1).”). 
227. See Struve, supra note 43, at 1135–36 (discussing Cooter & Gell and the 1993 amendments). 
228. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Contracting Access to the Courts: Myth or Reality? Boon or Bane?, 40 
ARIZ. L. REV. 965, 994 (1998) (“[B]oth the 1983 Amendment and the 1993 Amendment represent 
increased procedural hurdles and risk for litigants, resulting in a net shrinkage of access to courts.”); 
Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the Proposed Revision of Rule 11, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1775, 1788 
(1992); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 475 (1991). 
229. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 508 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
joined by Thomas, J., dissenting in part) (rejecting the amendments in part because they “contradict 
what this Court said only three years ago” in Cooter & Gell). 
230. Accord Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 571 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Marek v. 
Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 43 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).   
231. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court 
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations From Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1090–
91 (2008) (“[T]he Court usually does not apply Chevron to cases that are, according to Mead and 
other opinions, Chevron-eligible.  Moreover, in analyzing how Chevron is applied in the cases where 
it is invoked by the Court, [the authors] found little doctrinal consistency.”). 
232. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: 
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 1209–12 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing the 
relationship between the new textualism and Chevron and identifying some disagreement among 
Justices regarding the use of legislative history under step one); Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative 
Canons in the Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 64 (2008) (describing 
different judicial approaches to the role of substantive canons of statutory interpretation under the 
Chevron framework and claiming that “whether an agency policy comports with background norms should 
be considered as part of Chevron’s case-by-case, step-two inquiry into whether the policy is reasonable”). 
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the first step of Chevron.233  Second, statutory ambiguity is used as a signal under 
Chevron that an interpretive issue is a policy matter that should be resolved in an 
authoritative manner by an administrative agency, but ascertaining whether a 
statute is ambiguous can itself be a matter of great uncertainty.234  We agree with 
these observations about the application of Chevron, but we do not think that 
they present overwhelming difficulties for our proposal for two reasons.  The first 
is experience—the federal judiciary has applied the Chevron framework in countless 
cases for over a quarter century, and although there are undoubtedly difficult line-
drawing problems in some situations, we suspect that the framework provides 
a useful analytical device when statutes are either quite detailed or patently ambi-
guous.  Second and more importantly, the Court could avoid resolving close 
cases, where the degree of a Rule’s ambiguity is itself ambiguous, because we are 
advocating a strong presumption in favor of court rulemaking except where a 
case could be decided based solely on traditional tools of statutory interpretation.235  
If the Court lacks confidence that it will be able to resolve a civil procedure issue 
under the first step of a Chevron-like inquiry, it should simply decline to hear the 
case and refer the issue for resolution pursuant to the court rulemaking process.236 
Others might object that our proposal prohibits the intentional creation of 
civil procedure norms via a common law approach.  That is, the drafters of the 
Rules may, at times, deploy terms that do not have well-developed meaning upon 
issuance but purposely do so with the thought that the courts will fill in the meaning 
of the relevant terms through case-by-case adjudication.  Our response to such a 
critique is threefold.  First, our preference for rulemaking is limited to the Supreme 
Court.  As we discuss later,237 we do not intend our proposal to affect the interpre-
tive prerogatives of the lower federal courts.  Thus, under our proposal, a common 
  
233. See, e.g., ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 106, at 534–35 (observing that “judicial invocations of the 
test can sound perfunctory” in some cases, whereas in other cases “the court’s inquiry into ‘clear intent’ 
under step one of Chevron looks much more searching”). 
234. See Glen Staszewski, Textualism and the Executive Branch, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 143, 174; see 
also Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 
1091 (1997) (recognizing that the line between clarity and ambiguity under Chevron “has a highly 
random aspect to it”); Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
51 (2006). 
235. See supra Part II. 
236. The consequences of a perceived mistake are also probably lower in this context than they are in 
administrative law, where the legality of an agency’s decision is at issue.  Here, the only result of a 
mistaken decision would be to refer an issue for resolution pursuant to court rulemaking when the 
case could arguably have been resolved in a competent fashion pursuant to adjudication.  Given 
the small number of civil procedure issues that the Court resolves, and the significant advantages of 
court rulemaking, this would only be a relatively minor problem. 
237. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the retained flexibility for lower court Rules interpretation). 
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law approach to a Rules issue could percolate in the lower federal courts without 
immediate recourse to court rulemaking.  Second, we embrace the Supreme Court’s 
role of giving statutory terms meaning by adjudication, so long as the Court could 
do so by traditional rules of statutory interpretation.  In Foman v. Davis,238 for 
example, the Court was tasked to define when a district court could decline a motion 
for leave to amend a pleading when the text of the Rule was not self-defining.  The 
Court approached the question of defining Rule 15’s (as then drafted) language—
“leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires”239—by deploying 
a traditional statutory interpretation strategy.  The Court thus read the Rule 15 
provision as a part of the statute (i.e., the Rules) as a whole.240  The Court, in this 
manner, interpreted the leave-to-amend provision in Rule 15 vis-à-vis the general 
goals of Rule 1 and the pleading standards established by Rule 8(a)(2) as inter-
preted in Conley and delineated several grounds, such as futility or bad faith, when 
an amendment should not be allowed.241  Such action by adjudication fits com-
fortably within our traditional-tools-of-interpretation exception to our preference 
for rulemaking.  Finally, if traditional tools of statutory interpretation would not 
lead to a clear result, we continue to find that reference to the Rules Committee 
would be the better course as a matter of institutional competency, as explained in 
Part II. 
C. Legislative Rules v. Interpretive Rules 
A third way to conceptualize the distinction between issues that are appro-
priate for adjudication and those that should be resolved pursuant to court 
rulemaking is to draw upon an analogy to the distinction between legislative and 
interpretive rules in administrative law.  The Attorney General’s Manual on the 
APA defines a substantive rule, or a legislative rule, as a rule that has “the force and 
effect of law.”242  In the absence of an applicable exemption, Section 553 of the 
APA requires such rules to be promulgated pursuant to notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.243  A properly enacted and legally valid legislative rule has the same 
  
238. 371 U.S. 178 (1962). 
239. Id. at 182 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
240. Id.; see also Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 477 (1992) (stating that the 
plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to, among other things, 
the broader context of the statute as a whole). 
241. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. 
242. TOM C. CLARK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 30 n.3 (1947). 
243. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). 
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force and effect as a statute enacted by Congress.244  In contrast, the Attorney 
General’s Manual defines interpretative rules as “rules or statements issued by 
an agency to advise the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and 
rules which it administers.”245  Because interpretive rules merely set forth an 
agency’s views on what existing law already requires, they are exempt from the 
requirements of notice-and-comment rulemaking under the APA.246  As the Sixth 
Circuit has explained, “[t]he interpretative rule exemption reflects the idea that 
public input will not help an agency make the legal determination of what the law 
already is.”247  Moreover, Judge Posner has aptly described the rationale for this 
exemption: “There are no formalities attendant upon the promulgation of an inter-
pretive rule, but this is tolerable because such a rule is ‘only’ an interpretation.”248 
In our view, if the Court is resolving a civil procedure issue based on its inter-
pretation of what the Rules already require, then it is issuing the functional equiv-
alent of an interpretive rule, and the issue may appropriately be resolved pursuant 
to the less cumbersome process of adjudication.  Conversely, if the Court is, in 
effect, promulgating a new substantive Rule, then it is adopting the functional 
equivalent of a legislative rule, and it should refer the underlying issues for resolu-
tion pursuant to the court rulemaking process.249  As in the administrative law 
context, when the Court is effectively legislating, it should follow “notice and com-
ment rulemaking, a procedure that is analogous to the procedure employed by 
legislatures in making statutes.”250 
One problem, of course, is that federal courts have had great difficulty distin-
guishing between legislative and interpretive rules in some cases.251  Nevertheless, 
  
244. See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471, 474 (1937). 
245. CLARK, supra note 242, at 30 n.3. 
246. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). 
247. Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F.3d 666, 680 (6th Cir. 2005) (Rogers, J.). 
248. Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1996). 
249. Although not deploying administrative law terminology, the Court has often espoused this position.  
See, e.g., Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 764 (2001) (holding that the Court is not empowered 
to extend the meaning of a Rule outside of the rulemaking process); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. 
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993); Bus. Guides, Inc. v. 
Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 548–49 (1991); Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel 
Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989) (“Our task is to apply the text [of the Rule], not to improve 
upon it.”); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 298 (1969) (“We have no power to rewrite the Rules 
by judicial interpretations.”).  Given the interconnectivity of the Rules, this policy strikes most 
commentators as a sound one.  See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff & Arthur R. Miller, Celebrating Jack H. 
Friedenthal: The Views of Two Co-authors, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 9, 28 (2009). 
250. Hoctor, 82 F.3d at 171. 
251. See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1108–09 (D.C. Cir. 
1993); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules From Interpretative Rules, 52 ADMIN. 
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federal courts have provided some meaningful guidance that is useful for present 
purposes.  For example, in Hoctor v. United States Department of Agriculture,252 
the Seventh Circuit held that a requirement that “all dangerous animals must be 
inside a perimeter fence at least eight feet high” was not a valid interpretation of a 
legislative rule that required a facility housing animals to be “structurally sound” 
and “maintained in good repair to protect the animals from injury and to contain 
the animals.”253  Judge Posner explained that the purpose of the APA’s distinction 
between legislative and interpretive rules was to separate rules that require public 
notice and comment from those that do not.254  Accordingly, he suggested that 
valid interpretive rules would ordinarily be developed “by the methods of rea-
soning used by courts,” whereas legislative rules typically involve “the making of 
reasonable but arbitrary (not in the ‘arbitrary or capricious’ sense) rules that are 
consistent with the statute or regulation under which the rules are promulgated 
but not derived from it, because they represent an arbitrary choice among methods 
of implementation.”255 
The Court should use a similar analysis to distinguish civil procedure issues 
that are appropriate for resolution by adjudication from those that should be re-
solved pursuant to court rulemaking.  In other words, if a case can be decided 
pursuant to “the methods of reasoning used by courts,”—or by what we have styled 
traditional tools of interpretation—then it presents the type of normal or routine 
interpretive issue that may properly be decided by the Court pursuant to adju-
dication.  On the other hand, if a case would require the Court to make “arbitrary 
value judgments” regarding the appropriate rules of civil procedure, then the Court 
should refer the issues for resolution pursuant to the rulemaking process.  We 
think that it is clear, for example, that the changes in the standards of pleading 
announced by the Court in Twombly and Iqbal involved just the sort of arbitrary 
value judgments that should have been made pursuant to a legislative process.256  
Indeed, the Court could not plausibly have developed the precise content of its 
newly established standard through traditional tools of interpretation, given that 
the new interpretations (even if laudatory) are contrary to the original meaning of 
  
L. REV. 547, 547–48 (2000) (describing the federal judiciary’s characterization of its difficulties in 
drawing the requisite distinctions). 
252. 82 F.3d 165. 
253. 9 C.F.R. § 3.125(a) (1991). 
254. See Hoctor, 82 F.3d at 170. 
255. Id. 
256. See supra Part I A (discussing the change in pleading policy resulting from Twombly and Iqbal). 
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the text and all the relevant legislative history.257  Following standard adminis-
trative law, such a change should have been adopted pursuant to notice-and-
comment rulemaking.  
Continuing with our analogy to administrative law, the requirements for using 
notice-and-comment rulemaking to overturn prior interpretations of legislative 
rules offer helpful guidance on the role of stare decisis with regard to prior civil 
procedure decisions.  This is an issue that, as we noted previously, is particularly 
ripe for handling by the adoption of a presumption in favor of rulemaking.258  
Turning first to administrative practice, the D.C. Circuit has held that a rule should 
be designated as a legislative rule if it has “legal effect,”259 which would be the 
case when “the rule effectively amends a prior legislative rule.”260  That court also 
  
257. See supra notes 5, 34 (citing scholars discussing the divergence from the original meaning of Rule 
8).  As with the Chevron step-one and step-two distinction, the distinction between legislative and 
interpretive rules is not always crisp.  But, as with our Chevron analogy, the stakes of the distinction 
between interpretive and legislative rules are lower for court rulemaking than for agencies.  For instance, 
we are not advocating the invalidation of the Court’s decisions on the grounds that the Court has 
made law through the wrong policymaking vehicle, as occurs with agencies.  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)–
(c), 706(2)(D) (2006); Hoctor, 82 F.3d at 167.  Further, our presumption in favor of rulemaking 
means that in a close case the Court should opt for rulemaking over adjudication. 
258. One could conceivably argue that the Court’s decision in Conley was not a valid interpretive rule and 
that the issues presented in that case should have been resolved pursuant to the court rulemaking 
process.  The validity of this claim would depend, in part, upon one’s theory of interpretation.  While 
we cannot do justice to those perennial jurisprudential debates here, we believe that the Court’s deci-
sion in Conley comports with traditional methods of interpretation, as broadly understood from 
within the legal process tradition.  See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE 
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William 
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).  In particular, we believe that Conley is distin-
guishable in this regard from Twombly, partly because Conley purported to apply the settled 
understanding of Rule 8 when the case was decided, whereas Twombly explicitly overruled decades of 
well-established precedent.  This distinction suggests two important observations about the 
distinction between “legislation” and “interpretation” that are only latent in much of the literature.  
First, a decision is more plausibly characterized as “interpretive” when it is made shortly after a 
legislative rule was adopted in an effort to clarify, apply, or fill in the interstices of the recently enacted 
rule.  This is especially true when the decisionmaker was responsible for promulgating the rule at 
issue in the first place, as is frequently true of agencies and also of the Court in the field of civil 
procedure.  Cf. United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 549 (1940) (recognizing that 
an agency’s interpretations “are entitled to great weight,” particularly “where the interpretations 
involve contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of 
setting its machinery in motion; of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet 
untried and new,” and where the agency “suggested the provisions’ enactment to Congress” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  Second, the application of well-established precedent to a dispute should 
ordinarily count as a traditional element of interpretation.  Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip 
P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 378 (1990); Richard 
W. Murphy, Hunters for Administrative Common Law, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 917, 932 (2006). 
259. See Am. Mining Cong.v. Mine Safety Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1108–09 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
260. Id. at 1112.  The D.C. Circuit also set forth other criteria, which are not applicable in this context.  See id. 
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suggested that agencies cannot use interpretive rules to provide precise content 
to extremely vague or open-ended legislative rules because this practice would 
allow agencies to circumvent the obligation to use notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing for making legislative decisions.261  Most pertinent for the role of stare decisis, 
the courts of appeals take a similar position regarding the reformation of certain 
interpretive rules, prohibiting their reversal without the use of notice-and-com-
ment procedures.262  That is to say, agencies may not overturn a prior interpre-
tation of a rule when such a change would be substantial, unless it does so using 
the notice-and-comment form.   
Returning to the civil procedure context, if the Court’s decision would effec-
tively amend an existing rule of civil procedure—that is, craft a rule that is func-
tionally legislative as opposed to interpretive—the Court should refer the issue 
for resolution pursuant to the court rulemaking process.  Similarly, the Court 
should also refer a Rules issue for resolution pursuant to the court rulemaking 
process if the Rule the Court is purporting to interpret is too vague or open ended 
to produce precise content through traditional tools of interpretation.  A contrary 
practice would, as with administrative practice, allow the Court to promulgate 
(or amend) legally binding rules of civil procedure without using the legislative 
rulemaking process Congress established for that purpose.263 
Following standard administrative law doctrine, we also contend that replac-
ing one interpretation of a Rule with another interpretation of the same Rule 
should proceed by way of rulemaking.  Although this blackletter rule has aroused 
much sound criticism in the agency context,264 we find that the current doctrine 
  
261. See id. at 1110; see also Pierce, supra note 251, at 558–61 (discussing and endorsing this aspect of the 
court’s decision). 
262. See Alaska Prof’l Hunters Ass’n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1033–34 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“Once an 
agency gives its regulation an interpretation, it can only change that interpretation as it would 
formally modify the regulation itself: through the process of notice and comment rulemaking.” 
(quoting Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  This requirement does not apply to interpretive rules that 
overrule an agency’s prior interpretation of its statutory authority.  See Murphy, supra note 258, at 
928–30 (describing and criticizing the rationale for this distinction).  Under our analysis, however, 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are analogous to legislative rules promulgated by the Court rather 
than a statute enacted by Congress. 
263. Cf. Struve, supra note 43, at 1129 (“Should the Court wish to alter a Rule already in force, the 
Enabling Act does not contemplate that the Court could do so outside the rulemaking structure.”). 
264. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 258, at 918, 926–28 (describing the “scathing” academic critique of 
these decisions); Pierce, supra note 251, at 566–73 (arguing that the requirement is not supported 
by the APA and that it creates unwarranted difficulties for agencies that want to change their 
interpretations in response to new information or changed circumstances); Peter L. Strauss, Publication 
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has much to offer in the court rulemaking context for several reasons.  First, in 
contrast to agencies, the Court does not necessarily have the institutional capacity 
to ascertain whether new information or changed circumstances warrant overrul-
ing a prior interpretation of the Rules during the course of adjudication.265  Second, 
unlike agencies, the Court cannot actually promulgate interpretive rules outside 
of the court rulemaking or formal adjudication processes,266 and the Court therefore 
lacks a third alternative for interpreting law that is self-consciously designed to 
take advantage of agency expertise, especially on issues of legislative fact.267  Third, 
while agencies have the primary responsibility for interpreting the meaning of 
their own regulations (and cannot subdelegate this authority to others), the Court 
can rely on the lower federal courts to issue authoritative interpretations of the 
Rules of civil procedure in adjudication, and it should therefore only decide cases 
that present interpretive problems regarding the Rules when circuit splits develop 
or in other exceptional circumstances.268  Fourth, while some agencies issue thousands 
of interpretive rules on an annual basis,269 the Court decides fewer than one hun-
dred cases per year, only a fraction of which are Rules cases.270  Accordingly, the 
burden associated with using notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures to 
  
Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 803, 846–47 (2001). 
265. See supra notes 167–182 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties faced by the judiciary in 
assessing legislative facts). 
266. The Advisory Committee Notes are arguably analogous to interpretive rules promulgated by 
administrative agencies, but we believe that they are better viewed as an unusually authoritative form 
of legislative history because they are officially promulgated during the court rulemaking process 
pursuant to a statutory directive.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(d) (2006); Struve, supra note 43, at 1152 
(“[T]he Advisory Committee Notes possess distinctive claims to authority, based both on the terms 
of the Enabling Act and on the practicalities of rulemaking.”). 
267. Our proposal will therefore not create a perverse incentive for the Court to refrain from issuing 
interpretive rules.  It may, however, create a worthwhile incentive for the Court to think twice before 
granting certiorari in civil procedure cases. 
268. See ESTREICHER & SEXTON, supra note 20, at 4–5 (“[T]he Court’s principal objectives in selecting 
cases for plenary consideration should be to establish clearly and definitively the contours of national 
legal doctrine once the issues have fully ‘percolated’ in the lower courts, to settle fundamental 
interbranch and state-federal conflicts, and to encourage the state and federal appellate courts to 
engage in thoughtful decisionmaking, mindful of their own responsibility in the national lawmaking 
process.”); id. at 41–70. 
269. See, e.g., Nat’l Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 699 (D.C. Cir. 
1971) (reporting that the U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Administration responded to 
750,000 requests for advice about the interpretation and application of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
per year and that approximately 10,000 of these requests were signed by the administrator of the agency). 
270. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND 
DEVELOPMENTS 75 tbl.2-8, 80 tbl.2-11 (3d ed. 2003) (providing data on the number of signed 
opinions issued by the Court per year and the number of formally decided cases per term by issue area). 
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revise prior interpretations of legislative rules would be far less onerous in the 
latter context.  Fifth, there is a widely recognized need for greater interpretive 
flexibility by agencies that are charged with solving complex social problems at the 
forefront of science within a highly political environment,271 which is significantly 
less compelling in the context of the Court’s interpretation of the rules of civil 
procedure.  Sixth, while an agency’s decision to overrule a prior interpretation of 
its existing legal authority is typically subject to judicial review to ensure that the 
agency has engaged in reasoned decisionmaking,272 the Court’s decisions regarding 
the meaning or proper application of the existing Rules are not subject to any 
form of external review.273  For all these reasons, more would be achieved by 
funneling to the court rulemaking process potential decisions to overrule prior 
interpretations of the Rules than is gained from requiring agencies to use notice-
and-comment rulemaking to overrule prior interpretations of their regulations.  
We believe, therefore, that the Court should give precedents on the meaning of the 
Rules the same strong stare decisis effect that it has traditionally accorded to its 
interpretations of federal statutes.274  In both contexts, changes should generally 
be made through a legislative process. 
 
* * * 
 
In sum, we present a two-step approach.  First, the Court should adopt a 
presumption favoring the resolution of issues involving the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure pursuant to court rulemaking.  Thus, if the factors that favor an adju-
dicatory resolution present a tough case, the Court should err in favor of routing 
issues to the Advisory Committee.  Second, we offer three triggering criteria that 
reinforce this preference.  Thus, if a case requires an interpretation of a Rule 
  
271. See Edward Rubin, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, ISSUES LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP, NOV. 2002, http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art2 (claiming that the theory of 
dynamic statutory interpretation “is even more convincing with respect to the interpretive function 
of administrative agencies”); Staszewski, supra note 234, at 146, 156–58 (claiming that textualists 
have a tendency to become advocates of dynamic statutory interpretation when they examine the 
proper role of the executive branch in this enterprise); Strauss, supra note 264, at 828 (“[C]onsid-
erations of protecting justified reliance interests aside, we generally expect and indeed approve fluidity 
of policy development in the agency context.  Thus, one could expect agencies to assert considerably 
greater freedom of revision than courts think proper in their own practice.”). 
272. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810–11 (2009) (setting forth the 
standard of review for changes in agency policy). 
273. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“We are not final because we 
are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”). 
274. See supra notes 183–186 and accompanying text. 
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that rests substantially upon legislative facts, calls for the resolution of a Chevron-
step-two ambiguity, or seeks a legislative-rule-like resolution, then the Court 
should route it to the Rules Committee.  The Court should resolve by adjudi-
cation only those cases amenable to resolution by way of traditional tools of statu-
tory interpretation. 
IV. RULEMAKING PREFERENCE IN PRACTICE 
Our preference for notice-and-comment rulemaking on civil procedure issues 
raises several questions of implementation.  First, our conclusion begs the ques-
tion of how the Court can effectuate such a form preference.  These pragmatic 
considerations touch on constitutional concerns as well.  Second, the referencing 
of the majority of the Court’s Rules cases to the Advisory Committee may strike 
some as unduly limiting the judiciary’s need for flexibility in administering the civil 
rules.  Third, our scheme raises the issue of the democratic legitimacy of the Court 
as a rule promulgator.  We address these issues in turn. 
A. Referring Questions to the Advisory Committee 
The Court has two means currently at its statutory disposal for imple-
menting a preference for resolving civil procedure issues pursuant to rulemaking.  
First, the Court could simply deny certiorari to cases that raise Rules issues that 
are better suited to a rulemaking resolution and, after denying certiorari, recom-
mend that the Advisory Committee take up the issue raised.  Indeed, the Court 
selects nearly all of its cases by way of writ of certiorari.275  Although Supreme 
Court Rule 10 presents criteria likely to influence the Court’s exercise of its cer-
tiorari power, the Court’s ability to grant the writ is unfettered.276  Thus, as part 
of its certiorari-stage review the Court could identify—or require counsel by court 
rule to so identify—whether the present case requires a construction of a Rule 
that rests substantially on legislative facts, calls for the resolution of a Chevron-
step-two ambiguity, or seeks a legislative-rule-like resolution.  Having so identified 
these cases, the Court need only deny certiorari and notify the Advisory Committee. 
We do not, however, endorse this approach.  The most pressing concern we 
see with such an approach is that it renders the choice of policymaking form 
  
275. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257 (2006). 
276. See Sanford Levinson, Strategy, Jurisprudence, and Certiorari, 79 VA. L. REV. 717, 736 (1993) 
(reviewing H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT (1991)). 
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outcome determinative for the parties that originally raise the issue.  That is to 
say, under this first approach, the party seeking the procedural reform, or 
reinterpretation of the rule at issue, necessarily loses—even if in the end the Rule 
in question is reformed.  This follows from the denial of certiorari.  We contend 
that this approach would produce an unnecessary disincentive for parties (and, in 
particular, the losing party below) to welcome the initiation of a rulemaking 
proceeding in Rules cases, which could put pressure on the Court to eschew the 
rulemaking form.  As such, we prefer a second scheme available under current law 
that is akin to the certification of, or more accurately the referring of, a question of 
law from a federal court to a state supreme court or an Article I adjunct tribunal. 
We turn quickly, then, to a primer on certified questions.  The certification 
of a question of law is the process by which a court that lacks definitive authority 
to declare the substance of a particular rule of law seeks an authoritative declara-
tion of the rule from the relevant authoritative institution.277  This may be done 
within the hierarchical structure of a court system, as when a lower federal court 
stays current proceedings and awaits the result of a question certified to a higher 
federal court.278  Questions may also be certified inter-jurisdictionally between 
court systems, such as when a federal court stays proceedings in a diversity case 
and awaits the result of questions certified to a state supreme court.279  Addi-
tionally, in some states a federal agency may certify a question to a state supreme 
court, such as Delaware’s practice of enabling the Securities Exchange Commission 
to certify questions of Delaware law to the state supreme court.280  A similar 
process allows courts to route questions to an alternative forum even when they 
are authorized to resolve the issue at hand.  For example, the district courts hold 
exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases.281  Thus, they are 
fully capable of entering authoritative judgments in bankruptcy cases.  Nevertheless,  
 
  
277. See Allan D. Vestal, The Certified Question of Law, 36 IOWA L. REV. 629, 629–30 (1951) 
(“[C]ertification of questions of law is a procedure by which an inferior court is able to obtain from 
a defining court a conclusive answer to a material question of law.” (footnotes omitted)). 
278. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006) (allowing for the certification of interlocutory questions from district 
courts to courts of appeals); id. § 1254(b) (allowing for the certification of questions from courts of 
appeals to the Supreme Court). 
279. See Rebecca A. Cochran, Federal Court Certification of Questions of State Law to State Courts: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. LEGIS. 157, 159 & n.13 (2003) (citing statutes that enable 
federal-to-state certification and reviewing the practice). 
280. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8); see also Verity Winship, Cooperative Interbranch Federalism: 
Certification of State-Law Questions by Federal Agencies, 63 VAND. L. REV. 181, 195–98 (2010) 
(reviewing the Delaware law). 
281. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a). 
1236 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188 (2012) 
 
 
district courts are empowered to refer the resolution of these cases to non–
Article III bankruptcy courts282 and to withdraw those references (i.e., order the case 
back to the district court from the bankruptcy court).283 
While retaining the Advisory Committee’s current ability to receive sugges-
tions from any member of the public, we suggest that the Court operationalize 
the preference for a resolution of Rules issues in the rulemaking form by drawing 
from these practices of certification and referencing.  (We will term our scheme 
one of “referencing” questions to the Advisory Committee as this terminology 
more properly connotes the Supreme Court’s retention of declaratory power in 
Rules cases.)  The Court can accomplish this referencing practice by amendment 
to the Supreme Court Rules.  Thus, using the criteria that the Justices might 
otherwise deploy for determining whether to grant certiorari,284 the Court would 
determine whether a particular Rules case merits high court review.  At this stage, 
assuming the issue is cert-worthy, the Court could summarily grant the writ of 
certiorari, vacate the lower court opinion, remand the case, and order a stay 
pending action by the Advisory Committee.285  Such a move would, in effect, 
operate like a certification of a question from a court to an agency, insofar as 
the lower court is merely to await resolution of the question.  In a sense, this is the 
mirror image of the Delaware-SEC certification scheme.  The Court could then 
forward the issue to the Advisory Committee for notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.  Of course, this process ultimately requires the Court to approve of 
the newly proposed rule.  Thus, our scheme—which augments rather than 
displaces the general public’s current ability to offer suggestions to the Advisory 
Committee—is also similar to the bankruptcy referencing procedure insofar as the 
Court is referring the resolution of an issue to a non–Article III actor yet retaining 
ultimate authority over the issue.286 
The main advantage to this approach is that the choice of policymaking 
form here would not constitute a default loss for the party seeking the rule revi-
sion.  In fact, should a rule revision result from this process, the new rule would 
  
282. Id. § 157(a). 
283. Id. § 157(d). 
284. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, Strategy in Supreme Court Case Selection: The 
Relationship Between Certiorari and the Merits, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 7–16 (2008) (reviewing the papers 
of retired Justices to determine what criteria the Justices employ in case selection). 
285. See EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 345–49 (9th ed. 2007) (discussing 
the Supreme Court’s grant, vacate, and remand (GVR) practice). 
286. Cf. Frost, supra note 218, at 6–9 (presenting a similar scheme whereby statutory ambiguities may be 
resolved by staying a case, certifying the question to Congress, and applying the newly amended 
statute to the case retroactively). 
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apply to the case in the court of appeals after the stay is lifted.  Indeed, Rules 
revisions are regularly applicable to cases pending on appeal without retroactiv-
ity concerns.287  Further, this referencing approach, consistent with our analogy 
between the Court and agencies, follows the administrative practice that recog-
nizes that agencies have the discretion to stay adjudications to await the resolu-
tion of a rulemaking,288 as well as the judicial practice that recognizes that courts 
have the discretion to stay proceedings to await the resolution of a rulemaking.289  
Moreover, given that there is no constitutional right to an appeal in civil cases,290 
nor a statutory right (in most cases291) to Supreme Court review at all, the Court’s 
choice of a notice-and-comment venue as opposed to an adjudicatory one would 
not impose a due process injury on the parties. 
Our approach to rulemaking by reference, while achievable under current 
law coupled with Supreme Court Rules amendments, would also benefit from 
statutory reform.  One drawback to our proposal is the ossification of the current 
rulemaking process and the two-and-a-half-year period required to promulgate 
Rules under the current process.292  Indeed, we agree with Stephen Yeazell’s 
assessment that the current rulemaking process has become overly cumbersome 
with little added benefit to the quality of the finished product.293  Following Yeazell, 
  
287. Rule revisions are promulgated by the Court with the following provision: “[T]he foregoing 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall take effect on December 1, 1993, and 
shall govern . . . , insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings in civil cases then pending.”  Order 
Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 507 U.S. 1091, 1091 (1993).  As such, revised 
rules apply on appeal, even if the district court relied upon the preamended rule in its ruling.  See, 
e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1098 (3d Cir. 1995) (applying 
revised Rule 4(m) on appeal when the district court relied upon the preamended rule); see also Frost, 
supra note 218, at 50–52 (arguing that congressional modification of civil statutes upon certification 
of a question from the Supreme Court would not run contrary to retroactivity prohibitions). 
288. See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 2.802(d) (2012) (stating that a petitioner who has filed a petition for 
rulemaking “may request the Commission to suspend all or any part of any licensing proceeding to 
which the petitioner is a party pending disposition of the petition for rulemaking”); Massachusetts 
v. United States, 522 F.3d 115, 125 (1st Cir. 2008) (applying 10 C.F.R. § 2.802(d)); Nat’l Org. of 
Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(directing Veterans Affairs to complete an expedited rulemaking within 120 days, unless extended 
by the court, and to stay all adjudications under the rule until its validity was established); In re Tenn. 
Valley Auth. (Bellefonte Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4), 68 N.R.C. 361, 383 (2008) 
(recognizing that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had the discretion to stay an adjudication 
until the parties could complete a rulemaking but declining to exercise that discretion). 
289. See DAVID F. HERR ET AL., MOTION PRACTICE § 10.07(B) (5th ed. 2009). 
290. See Nat’l Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Arnold, 348 U.S. 37, 43 (1954). 
291. The only mandatory appeal to the Court now comes from three-judge district court panels.  28 
U.S.C. § 1253 (2006).  All other appellate review is done by writ of certiorari.  Id. §§ 1254, 1257. 
292. See McCabe, supra note 42, at 1671–72. 
293. See Yeazell, supra note 90, at 235. 
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we find that our proposal would work more efficiently if the Rules Enabling Act 
returned the rulemaking process to a three-step model that included Advisory 
Committee rulemaking, Court review, and congressional report-and-wait.294  To 
be sure, we do not entirely advocate a return to the 1934 regime, in which the 
Advisory Committee worked without notice-and-comment procedures.  But, like 
Yeazell, we see little added benefit resulting from multiple levels of committee review 
prior to promulgation of the Rules.  As such, we support statutory reforms that 
(1) specifically endorse the Court’s discretionary power to refer Rules questions to 
the Advisory Committee, (2) retain notice-and-comment rulemaking by the 
Advisory Committee, (3) specifically empower the Court to engage in a rigorous 
review of proposed rules (perhaps akin to a hard-look review),295 and (4) eliminate 
the roles of the Standing Committee and the Judicial Conference in Rules drafting. 
Reducing the rulemaking steps would lessen the time from the initiation of 
a rulemaking to the enactment of a revised Rule, rendering the entire rulemaking 
process not unacceptably longer than disposition on-the-merits by the Court.  
The average time between a grant of certiorari and a ruling on the merits by the 
Court is approximately nine months,296 while the average time to promulgate a 
rule under the current system is approximately thirty months.297  Elimination of 
review by the Judicial Conference alone would reduce the delay by seven months 
in every instance.298  This reduced twenty-three-month timeline could be further 
reduced by several more months with the elimination of review by the Standing 
Committee—which occurs both before and after notice-and-comment proce-
dures are deployed.  Assuming another five months of savings, one could expect 
rulemakings to come to fruition on approximately an eighteen-month timeline, 
which is the average length of time for the Ninth Circuit to dispose of appeals.299  
Thus, with some reforms, a rulemaking approach could conform to the timeline 
norms of the Ninth Circuit.  Admittedly, the Ninth Circuit is the least speedy 
court of appeals, but we find this a cost worth incurring for the procedural advan-
tages of the rulemaking form. 
  
294. See id. at 238–39. 
295. Cf. Walker, supra note 15, at 479 (advocating reforms to court rulemaking analogous to White 
House review of agency rulemaking). 
296. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Supreme Court’s Controversial GVRs—and an Alternative, 107 
MICH. L. REV. 711, 745 (2009). 
297. See McCabe, supra note 42, at 1671–72. 
298. See id. at 1673. 
299. See Carl Tobias, The Federal Appeals Courts at Century’s End, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 549, 563 
(2000) (relying on the 1998 Final Report of the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the 
Federal Courts of Appeals). 
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Such a statutory revision, moreover, likely would not lead to separation of 
powers difficulties.  First, the APA has long vested agencies with discretion in 
making a choice of policymaking form without raising the specter of separation 
of powers difficulties within the executive branch.300  Similarly here, such a sta-
tutory revision would merely vest the Court with the explicit discretion to choose a 
policymaking form,301 not impermissibly direct the outcomes of particular cases 
under the guise of a revision of procedural rules.302  Moreover, such a revision 
would rest upon the well-settled law holding that Congress is fully empowered 
to regulate the procedures of the lower federal courts and to set the means by 
which those procedures are established.303 
Finally, we would hope that by eliminating the roles of the Judicial Con-
ference and Standing Committee, and thereby streamlining the court rule-
making process, the Court would be encouraged to revive its more active role in 
reviewing, evaluating, and contributing to potential changes to the Rules.304  As 
we noted, the Justices have become increasingly removed from active involvement 
with the court rulemaking process since the Judicial Conference was established 
in 1958, which precluded the Advisory Committee from answering directly to 
the Court and led the Justices to serve as a mere conduit for the work of the 
rulemaking committees.305  We do not believe that this situation significantly 
undermines our claim that the Court functions as an administrative agency in the 
field of civil procedure.  After all, agency heads (like the Justices) frequently subde-
legate their statutory authority to “inferior officers” with greater expertise on a 
  
300. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (quoting Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1946)). 
301. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 76–77 (1982) (plurality 
opinion) (upholding the constitutionality of using administrative agencies, subject to review, as 
adjuncts to Article III courts). 
302. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995) (holding that Congress’s power to 
control court procedure does not allow it to reopen cases fully disposed of by the judicial department 
under the guise of a mere procedural change). 
303. See, e.g., Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136 (1992) (“Congress, acting pursuant to its 
authority to make all laws ‘necessary and proper’ to [the] establishment [of the lower federal courts], 
also may enact laws regulating the conduct of those courts and the means by which their judgments 
are enforced.” (footnotes omitted)); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941); Alaska Packers 
Ass’n v. Pillsbury, 301 U.S. 174 (1937); Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632 (1835); Wayman 
v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825). 
304. Cf. Burbank, supra note 90, at 249 (claiming that the Court’s current role in the court rulemaking 
process may be counterproductive). 
305. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
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topic,306 and agency heads are certainly not personally involved in all of the policy 
decisions that are made by their institutions.307  Moreover, there is nothing to prevent 
the Justices from playing a more active role in reviewing and evaluating (or even 
initiating) proposed changes to the Rules under the existing statutory scheme.308 
On the other hand, the Justices have chosen not to play an active role in court 
rulemaking for many years, and the Court cannot promulgate changes to the Rules 
without an affirmative recommendation by the respective committees.309  We 
suspect that if the court rulemaking process was streamlined, the Court’s role as the 
administrator of the Rules was explicitly recognized, and a presumption in favor 
of court rulemaking was established, the Court would have meaningful incentives 
to take greater ownership of the policy decisions that are made pursuant to this 
process.310  It may also be worthwhile to consider a statutory amendment that 
would allow the Court to modify the Rules on its own initiative, or over the 
objections of the Advisory Committee, as long as those changes were the product 
of notice-and-comment rulemaking and the Justices provided a reasoned explana-
tion for their final decision.  As explained below, however, we are somewhat reluc-
tant to embrace this final reform in the absence of an external review mechanism 
(other than a potential legislative veto) to ensure that the Justices do not engage in 
arbitrary decisionmaking.311  The end result, then, would be to return to the struc-
ture for court rulemaking that Congress established in 1934, supplemented by the 
procedures for public participation that were required by the Judicial Improvements 
and Access to Justice Act in 1988.312  
B. Preserving Flexibility for Lower Courts 
A potential objection to our proposal is that it would unduly limit the 
Court’s interpretive creativity or flexibility and thereby undermine the advantages 
  
306. See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 696, 735 (2007) (recognizing that “statutes often permit an agency head to subdel-
egate some of her authority” to trusted subordinates). 
307. See Note, Subdelegation by Federal Administrative Agencies, 12 STAN. L. REV. 808, 811 (1960) (“The 
policy favoring subdelegation in aid of efficient or competent operation is justified primarily because 
of the large volume and variety of tasks assigned to most agencies.”). 
308. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2074 (2006); McCabe, supra note 42, at 1672–73. 
309. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b); Struve, supra note 43, at 1129–30 (“Though the Court, like other entities, 
can suggest changes for the rulemakers’ consideration, it cannot promulgate such changes against 
the wishes of the other participants in the rulemaking process.” (footnotes omitted)). 
310. See supra note 98. 
311. See infra Part IV.C. 
312. See supra Part I.A (discussing past and present rulemaking processes). 
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of adjudication in some situations.  In this regard, there is no question that there 
are certain characteristic problems with rules.313  First, virtually all rules are over- 
and under-inclusive with respect to their animating purposes because legislative 
classifications are typically imperfect proxies for the actual traits that are relevant 
for accomplishing regulatory goals.314  Second, bright-line rules are apt to further 
their animating purposes in some places but not in others, particularly in an exten-
sive and geographically diverse jurisdiction like the United States.315  Third, the 
imprecision of legislative classifications is exacerbated as regulations age because 
changes in the world tend to render bright-line rules obsolete or, at least, less 
precise over time.316  Finally, even without unforeseen technological developments, 
the imprecision of language and limitations on foresight prevent lawmakers 
from anticipating some of the circumstances to which their bright-line rules could 
subsequently apply.317  Rules are therefore frequently ambiguous as applied to 
the facts of a particular case, and even when they have a seemingly plain meaning, 
rules can lead to absurd results that were not contemplated or intended when 
lawmakers adopted them.318  Adjudication is therefore frequently necessary and 
appropriate to resolve the ambiguities of legal rules.319  Moreover, the promul-
gation of law or policy though adjudication could potentially avoid the problems 
with rules in the first place because case-by-case decisionmaking is more flexible, 
dynamic, and incremental than rulemaking, in addition to being cheaper and 
easier to utilize in some circumstances.320  For these reasons, administrative law 
contains several doctrines that allow administrators to exercise equitable discretion 
  
313. See generally Sunstein, supra note 139. 
314. See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 
360 (1949). 
315. See Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 219–20 (1976). 
316. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 2 (1982) (describing 
the problem of “legal obsolescence” in an age of statutes); Sunstein, supra note 139, at 993 (“Rules 
are often shown to be perverse through new developments that make them anachronistic.”). 
317. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency 
Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 647 (1996). 
318. See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2388 (2003) (“From the 
earliest days of the Republic, the Supreme Court has subscribed to the idea that judges may deviate 
from even the clearest statutory text when a given application would otherwise produce ‘absurd’ 
results.”); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 29 
(2001) (“The idea of equitable interpretation builds upon the Aristotelian premise that equity should 
mitigate the defects of generally worded laws.”). 
319. See ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 106, at 195. 
320. See id. at 194–95 (describing the advantages of adjudication). 
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and that soften the hard edges of bright-line rules in particular cases.321  It is also 
widely understood that even if administrative agencies use rulemaking to make 
most of their law and policy, they will inevitably need to conduct a certain amount 
of “residual adjudication.”322 
This objection to our proposal, then, would focus on the positive value of 
allowing adjudicators to exercise equitable discretion and reach sensible results in 
particular cases, even when the applicable rule is patently ambiguous or when the 
most straightforward application of a rule would lead to absurd or highly proble-
matic results.  For the most part, however, the exercise of equitable discretion and 
the resolution of patent ambiguity are aspects of statutory interpretation that would 
be employed during the second step of a Chevron-like inquiry or the crafting of a 
legislative rule.323  Our proposal, therefore, effectively discourages the Court from 
exercising equitable discretion or resolving patent ambiguity in Rules interpre-
tation cases and thereby precludes the Court from providing some of the most 
important benefits of adjudication.  Indeed, if the Court were to follow our ad-
vice, it would nearly eliminate cases involving the Rules from its docket.  That is 
so because under our proposal, the Court should only decide cases involving the 
Rules that (1) are deemed cert-worthy under its usual criteria and (2) present rela-
tively straightforward issues of statutory interpretation.  Most interesting civil 
procedure issues would, in contrast, be referred to the Advisory Committee for 
resolution pursuant to the court rulemaking process. 
We agree that this could be a significant problem if the Court had exclusive 
jurisdiction over civil procedure issues.  There are, however, federal district courts 
and circuit courts of appeals that decide issues involving the Rules on a regular 
basis—indeed, much more regularly than the Supreme Court.  Moreover, unlike 
the Supreme Court, lower federal courts do not have delegated authority to revise the 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and they must therefore resolve the issues that are 
  
321. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to Administrative Rules, 1982 
DUKE L.J. 277; Cass R. Sunstein, Avoiding Absurdity? A New Canon in Regulatory Law, 32 ENVTL. 
L. REP. 11126 (2002). 
322. See ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 106, at 195. 
323. See, e.g., Am. Water Works Ass’n v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266, 1269–71 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (upholding 
EPA’s reasonable interpretation of the Safe Drinking Water Act under the second step of Chevron, 
despite an apparent conflict with the statutory text, and explaining that “where a literal reading of a 
statutory term would lead to absurd results, the term simply has no plain meaning . . . and is the 
proper subject of construction by the EPA and the courts” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Sunstein, supra note 321, at 11132 (describing the invocation of the absurdity doctrine in this fashion 
as “a modest means” of counteracting the pervasive existence of legislative misfit in the modern regu-
latory state, which is “an extremely serious problem for which it is important to find correctives”). 
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presented to them during adjudication.324  We are not proposing any partic-
ular method of Rules interpretation for the lower courts in this Article.325  Nor 
are we suggesting that lower federal courts should be precluded from using 
equitable methods of interpretation in Rules cases.  Rather, we believe that 
lower federal courts are in a good position to provide the foregoing advantages 
of adjudication in cases involving the Rules.326  We also believe that by having a 
variety of lower courts resolve such issues pursuant to a variety of interpretative 
methods, the rulemakers will ultimately be able to take advantage of this 
experimentation as issues involving the Rules percolate their way up the federal 
judicial ladder.327  Our claim is simply that by the time these issues reach the 
Supreme Court, they should presumptively be resolved pursuant to rulemaking 
rather than adjudication. 
C. Deliberative Democracy as Political Legitimacy 
While we are not overly concerned that our approach would raise constitu-
tional concerns or interfere with the equitable discretion of the judiciary,328 we do 
  
324. Our proposal anticipates that only the Supreme Court would be expressly authorized to stay pending 
cases and refer civil procedure issues to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee for resolution pursuant 
to court rulemaking.  While we believe that it would be impractical to extend this authority to federal 
district courts and circuit courts of appeals, our proposal could potentially extend to cases in the circuit 
courts that have been certified for rehearing en banc.  Cf. Frost, supra note 218, at 6 (“[T]he U.S. 
Supreme Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals acting en banc should be given the authority to abstain 
from deciding cases before them and send questions about statutory meaning to Congress.”). 
325. Our claim that the Court should only decide civil procedure cases that can be resolved through 
traditional tools of interpretation would result in an interpretive approach similar to what is 
advocated by David Marcus, see supra note 34, and Catherine Struve, see supra note 43.  We are not 
convinced, however, that this approach would necessarily be appropriate in every case that lower 
federal courts decide.  Moreover, our approach differs from that of Struve because she grounds her 
proposal on a formal interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act, see Struve, supra note 43, at 1102, 
whereas our proposal is grounded on well-established principles of sound administrative practice.  
Our proposal also differs from that of Marcus because he claims that “judges should interpret rules 
such that significant changes to the procedural status quo come from the rulemaking process,” 
Marcus, supra note 34, at 51–52, whereas we contend that the Court should not decide those cases pur-
suant to adjudication but should instead refer the issues for resolution pursuant to court rulemaking. 
326. Cf. Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 6 (“Lower courts may adhere to the traditional model of dispute 
resolution with the assurance that their opinions are not a large source of rules.  The Supreme Court 
has no such comfort.”). 
327. See Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court’s Responsibilities: 
An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 699 & n.68 (1984) (“By leaving courts of appeals free to 
decide independently issues already decided by other courts of appeals, the system encourages the 
‘percolation’ of legal issues[, which has significant] benefits.”). 
328. See supra notes 290–291, 300–303 and accompanying text. 
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find questions concerning the political legitimacy of Supreme Court rulemaking 
ones worth more elaboration.  Our claims that the Court’s lawmaking role in the 
field of civil procedure is analogous to the lawmaking authority of administra-
tive agencies and that the Court should make most of its policy decisions through 
notice-and-comment rulemaking raise fundamental questions about the legiti-
macy of the Court’s role in this enterprise.  After all, one line of conventional 
wisdom is that the Court comprises independent Justices with life tenure who 
are politically unaccountable and therefore have no business making policy deci-
sions in a democracy in the first place.329  Instead of proposing that the Court 
increase its legislative activity in this field, this view would suggest that we should 
criticize the Court’s “activism” and call for the promulgation of rules of civil 
procedure by Congress or the President.  In short, our call for increased court 
rulemaking faces a prima facie democratic legitimacy concern. 
We do not believe, however, that the implementation of our proposals would 
undermine the legitimacy of the court rulemaking process.  On the contrary, if 
the Court regularly referred to a notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure 
those policy questions that cannot be resolved pursuant to traditional tools of 
statutory interpretation, the democratic legitimacy of its decisionmaking would 
be significantly enhanced.  It is widely recognized in administrative law that 
notice-and-comment rulemaking provides opportunities for public participation 
and obligations for decisionmakers to consider a range of different perspectives, 
which improve the legitimacy of the administrative process.330  Because we are 
confident that the salutary functions of notice-and-comment procedures would be 
served by using the court rulemaking process to make policy decisions in the field 
of civil procedure, we believe that implementing our proposal would improve the 
democratic legitimacy of lawmaking in this area, in comparison to the status quo. 
  
329. See Bressman, supra note 93, at 480 (“Post-Bickel, scholars began to distrust not only judicial use of 
individual rights to invalidate popularly enacted statutes, but any policy decision made by unelected 
officials.”); Jonathan T. Molot, Ambivalence About Formalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007). 
330. See Abramowicz & Colby, supra note 19, at 1006 n.210 (quoting Stephen M. Johnson, The Internet 
Changes Everything: Revolutionizing Public Participation and Access to Government Information 
Through the Internet, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 277, 289 (1998) (“Public participation is essential to 
sound agency decisionmaking because . . . it instills a sense of legitimacy in the public for the agency’s 
decisions.”)); Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative 
Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 187 (1997); see also Nina A. Mendelson, 
Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1343 (2011) 
(describing commentators’ “[b]old claims” regarding the capacity of notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing to promote democracy and legitimize agency policy decisions). 
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Nonetheless, our analysis undoubtedly highlights the broad discretionary 
authority that Congress has delegated to the Court to make policy in the field of 
civil procedure.  In light of the unelected status of the federal judiciary, this broad 
delegation of lawmaking authority raises the same fundamental problems of 
legitimacy that have always posed challenges for the modern regulatory state.331  
Indeed, as we explained above, the intellectual histories of the legitimacy of court 
rulemaking and of the legitimacy of the modern administrative state have fol-
lowed parallel trajectories.332  Indeed, as we explained above, the intellectual 
histories of the legitimacy of court rulemaking and the legitimacy of the modern 
administrative state have followed parallel trajectories.  It is worthwhile therefore 
to consider the current thinking about the modern administrative state’s legiti-
macy, and to evaluate the legitimacy of the court rulemaking process pursuant to 
the prevailing standards. 
In this regard, the leading model of legitimacy for the regulatory state at this 
time is the “political control model” of administrative law.333  This model focuses 
on the ability of elected officials to supervise and control the discretionary policy 
choices of administrative agencies as the basis for democratic legitimacy.334  The 
central idea is that if agencies are following the preferences of elected officials 
who are politically accountable to voters, then agency policy decisions will be 
democratically legitimate because they will presumably reflect the will of the 
people and achieve the consent of the governed.335  The political control model is 
based on a majoritarian or pluralistic conception of democracy, which reflects 
“a belief in the hegemony of popular control of all governmental decisions.”336  
The model also exemplifies an aggregative view of democracy, whereby the 
primary role of government is merely to ascertain and implement the pre-political 
  
331. See Walker, supra note 15, at 462–63 (recognizing “[t]he vast discretion exercised by the Advisory 
Committee” and claiming that the court rulemaking process raises the same fundamental legitimacy 
concerns as broad delegations of lawmaking authority to administrative agencies). 
332. See supra Part I.C. 
333. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 93, at 485–92; Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in 
Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 35 (2009). 
334. See Watts, supra note 333, at 35; see also Glen Staszewski, Political Reasons, Deliberative Democracy, 
and Administrative Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 849, 856–57 (2012) (describing the political control model). 
335. See, e.g., McNollgast, The Political Economy of Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
1651, 1663 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavel eds., 2007); Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal 
Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53, 56–58 (2008). 
336. Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 538 
(1998); see also Bressman, supra note 93, at 478. 
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preferences of its citizens.337  It is widely recognized that the premises of the polit-
ical control model “imply the need for presidential control over bureaucratic 
policymaking, because the president is the institutional actor most responsive to 
the preferences of a national majority.”338  The dominant theory of legitimacy in 
administrative law for the past quarter century has therefore been the “presidential 
control model,” a version of the political control model.339  From this perspective, 
Congress’s delegation of broad policymaking authority to administrative agencies, 
which would otherwise be difficult to square with the American constitutional 
structure and principles of democracy, can be legitimized if agency decisions are 
subject to the control of the Chief Executive who is politically accountable to all of 
the nation’s voters. 
The court rulemaking process is a mixed bag from the perspective of the 
political control model.  On the one hand, the court rulemaking process requires 
the Court to present proposed changes to the Rules to Congress and gives 
Congress the opportunity to veto any proposed changes that it finds undesira-
ble.340  While some civil procedure scholars have heavily criticized Congress’s 
exercise (or threatened exercise) of its veto authority,341 the meaningful use of 
this authority seems desirable and perhaps even necessary to ensure that the Court’s 
decisions are consistent with the preferences of Congress (and theoretically, by 
extension, the people).342  If anything, we should be concerned that the proce-
dural hurdles of the legislative process and other transaction costs make it too 
difficult for members of Congress to veto proposed changes to the rules that a 
majority of elected representatives do not support.343  Nonetheless, it is generally 
easier for Congress to veto a proposed change to the Rules than to override an  
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(2009) (claiming that the presumption that elected officials are politically accountable to the voters 
for their specific policy choices is generally implausible). 
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unpopular judicial decision, and our proposal to use rulemaking rather than adju-
dication to make policy decisions in the field of civil procedure would therefore 
increase the level of political control that is exercised over such decisions.  The real 
problem with the court rulemaking process, from this perspective, is the absence 
of direct presidential influence or control over the contents of the Rules.344  We sus-
pect that the President could use the bully pulpit to make some headway in this 
regard, and there is nothing to prevent the White House from participating in 
the notice-and-comment rulemaking process.  Moreover, the Justice Department 
is sometimes a very influential participant in court rulemaking.345  We acknowledge, 
however, that the court rulemaking process is problematic from the perspective 
of presidential control theories of democratic legitimacy. 
We are not particularly troubled, however, by the absence of presidential 
control over court rulemaking.  Indeed, one of us has previously challenged the 
validity of this model of legitimacy on the grounds that policymaking in a consti-
tutional democracy is not, and should not try to be, purely majoritarian and that 
even if we wanted policy decisions to reflect the pre-political preferences of the 
people, relying on elected officials to control the discretionary choices of agencies 
could not plausibly be expected to produce this outcome.346  The leading alterna-
tives to political control theories of administrative legitimacy tend to focus on the 
importance of reasoned deliberation to a legitimate and normatively attractive 
conception of democracy.347  Deliberative models of legitimacy therefore focus 
on public officials’ obligation to engage in reasoned deliberation on which courses 
of action will promote the public good.348  Agency officials must engage in a 
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decisionmaking process that considers all of the relevant interests and perspectives,349 
and they must provide reasoned explanations for their decisions that free and 
equal citizens with fundamentally competing perspectives could reasonably 
accept.350  Agency decisions adopted pursuant to these criteria are democratically 
legitimate because each interest and perspective is treated with equal respect and 
arbitrary decisionmaking is prohibited.351  A deliberative model of administrative 
legitimacy is based on broader theories of deliberative democracy, which seek to 
eliminate arbitrary governmental action and reach the best decisions on the merits 
in light of the available information and fundamental differences of opinion.352 
We believe that the court rulemaking process fares relatively well from the 
perspective of deliberative theories of democratic legitimacy.  Administrative 
law scholars have long recognized that notice-and-comment rulemaking 
contributes to the legitimacy of policymaking by administrative agencies, largely 
because it promotes the foregoing principles of deliberative democracy.353  The 
notice-and-comment procedures followed by the Advisory Committee as part of 
the court rulemaking process provide fundamentally the same advantages.  First, 
such procedures perform an informational function by allowing anyone who 
could be affected by a proposed rule to bring information and potential concerns 
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to the decisionmakers’ attention.354  Second, those procedures contribute to the 
legitimacy of policymaking on civil procedure issues by giving affected parties an 
adequate opportunity to participate in the process and by ensuring that rulemak-
ers have the information necessary to engage in reasoned decisionmaking.355  
Third, this aspect of court rulemaking performs a constraining function by limiting 
the ability of decisionmakers to act arbitrarily or in a manner that is inconsistent 
with the law or the public interest.356 
The primary concern about the legitimacy of court rulemaking from a deli-
berative perspective is undoubtedly the absence of an enforcement mechanism, 
such as hard-look judicial review, to prevent the rulemakers from making arbitrary 
decisions.357  Although we believe that this is a serious concern, we do not think 
that it is fatal to the legitimacy of court rulemaking—or our proposal to expand its 
use—for several reasons.  First, our proposed referencing procedure could perform 
a function analogous to hard-look judicial review in the sense that it would effec-
tively remand ambiguities and other unanticipated problems with the Rules to 
the rulemaking process for further consideration.358  Second, the court rulemak-
ing process contains several safeguards that reduce the likelihood of arbitrary de-
cisionmaking, even in the absence of an external enforcement mechanism.  For 
starters, the Advisory Committee is obligated to consider seriously the comments 
that are submitted in response to proposed Rule changes and to engage in rea-
soned deliberation during the court rulemaking process.359  Moreover, the Advisory 
Committee and the Court are likely to be sensitive to reputational considerations, 
and the manner in which the court rulemaking process was conducted in any 
particular case could easily be reviewed and evaluated by interested members of 
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the bench, bar, and legal academy.360  Perhaps most important, a proposed change 
to the Rules can only be adopted (both under the existing court rulemaking process 
and under our proposal) pursuant to the agreement of the Advisory Committee and 
a majority of the Court.361  While this requirement for consensus arguably dis-
tinguishes court rulemaking from other administrative rulemaking processes,362 
we think that the obligation for the Advisory Committee and the Court (as well 
as Congress) to agree on proposed changes to the Rules significantly reduces the 
risk of arbitrary decisionmaking in this context.  The obligation therefore provides 
an important structural safeguard that improves the legitimacy of the court 
rulemaking process from the perspective of deliberative democracy, functioning 
in much the same way as the Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment re-
quirements.363  Finally, it is noteworthy that leading scholars of the legitimacy of 
the court rulemaking process have embraced a deliberative model of legitimacy 
that is consistent with many of the principles described above.364  Similarly, we 
believe that the Court’s promulgation of rules of civil procedure through a notice-
and-comment rulemaking process, which adequately considers and responds  
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to a broad range of competing interests and perspectives, is a democratically legi-
timate method for making policy choices in this area.  Indeed, there are good 
reasons to believe that this process is generally superior to rulemaking by a rela-
tively uninformed and politically motivated Congress or President.365  We are 
even more confident that this process is superior to policymaking by the Court 
pursuant to adjudication. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have advanced the notion that the Supreme Court ought 
to route most of its Rules decisions through the notice-and-comment rulemaking 
process instead of issuing judgments in adjudications.  While we are not the first 
to have reached this conclusion, we believe our justification by analogy to admin-
istrative law, explicit preference for rulemaking, three triggering criteria, and novel 
referencing procedure represent a significant move from the mere expression of a 
preference to an actionable theory concerning the Supreme Court’s choice of 
policymaking form.  Even if we fail to convince some—or many—of the wisdom 
of our approach, it is our hope that jurists and scholars will give the Court’s deci-
sions regarding its choice of policymaking form more attention and care.  For if 
proceduralists learn nothing else from administrative law, it is that the venue for 
making policy decisions matters.  But, of course, this is a lesson we already knew.366 
 
 
  
365. See Bone, The Process of Making Process, supra note 16, at 921–26 (claiming that “congressional 
rulemaking is likely to generate serious public choice inefficiencies, which could be reduced signifi-
cantly by using a court-based committee-centered process”); Burbank, supra note 90, at 228; 
Carrington, supra note 341, at 165–66; Geyh, supra note 89, at 1222; Mullenix, supra note 341, at 
801–02; Stancil, supra note 343, at 100; Walker, supra note 15, at 460. 
366. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (holding that, in diversity cases, choice of forum 
will affect rules for service); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that choice 
of law should not affect decisions regarding the choice of federal forum). 
